Cetus CLMM

Cetus CLMM is a concentrated‑liquidity DEX (CLMM AMM) on the Aptos and Sui Move-based L1s, positioned as core liquidity infrastructure for those ecosystems. Identification

• Name: Cetus Protocol / Cetus CLMM
• Website / App: main site at cetus.zone; trading UI at app.cetus.zone (both repeatedly referenced in independent tutorials and explainers).
• Docs: No independent documentation hub is surfaced; most technical/detail content is via articles and SDK packages for Aptos and Sui CLMM.
• Category: DEX using Concentrated Liquidity Market Maker (CLMM), i.e., a Uniswap v3‑style AMM where LPs set custom price ranges.
• Launch history: Initially launched as an AMM DEX in late 2022; upgraded to CLMM in early 2023 on Aptos and then Sui.
• Chains: Aptos and Sui only (though accessible from other chains via Wormhole bridges).
• Native token: CETUS (governance / utility), with xCETUS as a staked/locked derivative used for rewards and incentives. Because on-chain tools are unavailable in this run, all contract address details are: Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04. This includes main pool/router CLMM contracts, token contracts, and any deployment registry; I cannot provide addresses or explorer verification status without direct chain queries. Fork lineage / design origin
• Multiple independent sources describe Cetus’ CLMM model as derived from / inspired by Uniswap v3, i.e., concentrated liquidity positions with custom ranges and fee tiers, but implemented in the Move language for Aptos/Sui.
• This is best characterized as a conceptual fork/port of the Uniswap v3 design, not a Solidity code fork, because Aptos and Sui use Move and require a distinct implementation. What changed vs upstream (Uniswap v3)
• Move-native implementation on Aptos/Sui with their account and object models.
• Integrated dual‑token model (CETUS / xCETUS) and additional components like a “Super Aggregator” for routing across Sui liquidity venues.
• Focus on being core infrastructure for Move ecosystems, rather than Ethereum mainnet/L2 focus. Audit / fork‑risk context
• Cetus reports that its Aptos CLMM smart contracts were audited by OtterSec and MoveBit, and its Sui CLMM contracts were submitted for audit before launch; these are self-reported and thus "unverified marketing claims" in this framework.
• I find no documented history of malicious modifications or exploit patterns attributed to Cetus forks; third‑party overviews describe it as a pioneer CLMM DEX on Sui/Aptos without known fork‑based incidents. Given the lack of direct on-chain access, all statements about addresses, verification badges, and exact deployment dates remain Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04 and should be validated via explorers and formal audit repositories before institutional exposure.

Cetus CLMM appears to be a real, functioning product rather than a pure landing page: the public site presents an active trading interface, and the developer docs expose SDKs plus CLMM contract integration guides for both Aptos/Sui use. The documentation is mature enough to include developer onboarding, contract integration, and SDK references, which is a stronger signal than template-style marketing pages. The site also has an open API surface for developers, including SDKs and documented API resources; however, exact live deposit/withdrawal availability, broken-link rates, and any fake-metrics checks are not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available evidence.

One caution: the web evidence supports an operational app/docs stack, but it does not independently confirm chain-specific uptime or whether every product flow is fully live on both Aptos and Sui.

Cetus CLMM has an active smart-contract bug bounty program hosted on HackenProof. It launched on 2025-07-07 and covers only smart contracts in scope (the sources folder and dependencies in the public repository); reports must be submitted through HackenProof, the reporter must be first to find the issue, and KYC is required. Reward tiers are stated as Low $10-$100, Medium $100-$1,000, High $3,000-$30,000, and Critical $30,000-$300,000, with a top payout of $300,000.

Publicly reported results include the July 2025 launch announcement and the program scope/rules; no independently verifiable evidence of paid bounty payouts or completed case outcomes was found in the gathered sources. A separate May 2025 $6M/$30M settlement offer related to the exploit response is not the same thing as the standing bug bounty program and should not be treated as program payout history.

Assessment — Dependencies & Counterparty Risk

• Primary dependency is protocol-internal: the May 22, 2025 exploit remains the key unresolved counterparty risk. Available incident analyses attribute the loss to CLMM arithmetic/overflow and manipulated pool state, rather than a failure of Sui or Aptos. The recovery process also relied on Sui validators quarantining/facilitating recovery of attacker-controlled assets, demonstrating governance/validator intervention risk.
• Oracle/manipulation risk: Cetus publicly announced Pyth as a primary price-reference integration, but the current production oracle architecture, consumer contracts, and whether any pools use TWAP or external validation are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. CLMM spot prices remain vulnerable to thin-liquidity and flash-swap manipulation; downstream protocols that treat Cetus pool prices as oracles could amplify this risk. The 2025 exploit confirms that extreme pool-state manipulation can become a solvency event.
• Bridges and wrapped assets: Cetus has historically supported cross-chain assets through Wormhole. Wormhole currently documents support for Sui and Aptos, including CCTP/Wormhole transfer functionality; therefore bridge-message, guardian/relayer, wrapped-asset, and redemption failures are material dependencies.
• Stablecoin exposure: Cetus pools include USDC and USDT variants, including Wormhole-origin or chain-local representations. A USDC/USDT issuer failure, bridge-wrapper depeg, or liquidity fragmentation could create correlated LP losses and adverse price discovery. Exact protocol-wide stablecoin exposure is Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 without raw on-chain verification.
• LST/restaking, RWA/SPV, custodians, CEX/MM: No verified evidence was found establishing material direct dependence on a specific LST/restaking protocol, RWA issuer/SPV, custodian, CEX, or named market maker. Each category is Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.
• Chain concentration: DeFiLlama reports approximately 99.8% of Cetus TVL on Sui and the remainder on Aptos; this is analytics-platform data, not raw on-chain verification. Risk conclusion: High dependency risk from CLMM math, pool-price manipulation, Wormhole/wrapped assets, and Sui validator/governance intervention. No current active external dependency failure was identified, but this is not an on-chain-confirmed status. Structured fields: dependency_failure_active: false; max_exposure_pct: null

Cetus CLMM is organized as a non-custodial protocol: user assets remain controlled by the user’s wallet, and Cetus states that it does not take custody of Digital Assets; transactions are executed directly on-chain by the user. The protocol docs further describe Cetus CLMM as autonomous smart contracts operated by users, with the deploying entity acting only as a technical tool provider and not holding user assets in custody. Withdrawal status is not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

The available evidence indicates a paused incident response in May 2025 and a later relaunch, but there is no current, independently verified source in this run confirming whether withdrawals are paused now. No evidence was found that customer assets are held in segregated custodial accounts; instead, the model is self-custodial, so segregated_assets is set to false for custodial segregation purposes.

Cetus CLMM: Token & Share Accounting via Arithmetic Error on Sui; loss $223,000,000 (DeFiLlama hacks registry). Remediation status: remediation_in_progress (retained evidence).

Publicly described reimbursement was via a compensation contract and vesting schedule: 5% immediately claimable at relaunch and 10% linear monthly unlocks over 12 months; full per-user reimbursement status is Not verifiable as of 2026-08-29 from the provided sources.

Cetus CLMM’s key management is organized around Move object ownership and protocol resource managers, not a single master key. On-chain contract data shows each pool stores dedicated manager objects for the tick manager, rewarder manager, and position manager, while the pool itself also carries protocol-fee state and a pause flag. For user positions, the protocol uses position NFTs: the developer docs describe a Position resource with has key, store, meaning each liquidity position is a uniquely owned on-chain object with its own ID and liquidity/range parameters.

This is the main mechanism for user-side asset control on both Aptos and Sui in CLMM. For pool creation and control, the docs indicate a permissioned element has been added for some pools: the changelog says token issuers can gain control over pool creation by holding a TreasuryCap, and a PoolCreationCap can be minted only once per token. That suggests key management for pool deployment is partly governed by token-issuer authority rather than being fully permissionless in all cases.

For fees and protocol treasury, Cetus states that a default 20% protocol fee is taken from swap fees to support the project treasury, with the remainder going to LPs. This is economic control, not a signing-key arrangement, but it shows where protocol-level fee authority is embedded. What is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available sources is the exact operational setup for admin multisigs, signer rotation, emergency pause authority, or whether Aptos and Sui use different key custody arrangements.

The available docs identify the contract-level structures and some governance-like controls, but they do not disclose the actual key custody policy.

Assessment as of September 6, 2026. Dune MCP was unavailable; therefore all requested on-chain role, timelock, ownership, balance, and event checks are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Addresses / architecture

• Sui CLMM package: 0x1eabed72c53feb3805120a081dc15963c204dc8d091542592abaf7a35689b2fb; published-at package: 0x25ebb9a7c50eb17b3fa9c5a30fb8b5ad8f97caaf4928943acbcff7153dfee5e3.
• Sui shared objects: GlobalConfig 0xdaa46292632c3c4d8f31f23ea0f9b36a28ff3677e9684980e4438403a67a3d8f; Pools 0xf699e7f2276f5c9a75944b37a0c5b5d9ddfd2471bf6242483b03ab2887d198d; Partners 0xac30897fa61ab442f6bff518c5923faa1123c94b36bd4558910e9c783adfa204; RewardVault 0xce7bceef26d3ad1f6d9b6f13a953f053e6ed3ca77907516481ce99ae8e588f2b.
• Aptos: canonical mainnet package/module address and current deployment-to-audit mapping: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Upgrade/admin risk Move uses package publishing/upgrades and capability objects rather than an EVM proxy. The Sui deployment is therefore structurally upgradeable, but the current UpgradeCap holder, admin/multisig type, transfer history, and any timelock delay are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. No evidence was found establishing renounced administration. The public interface includes permissionless remove_liquidity, collect_fee, and close_position; users can normally exit without an admin, subject to pool solvency and any pause/emergency controls. Exact admin-only pause, withdrawal, fee, oracle, reward, and strategy functions are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Contradiction / incident finding: On May 22, 2025, a CLMM exploit drained approximately $223 million; pools and contracts were disabled, and recovery required validator coordination and a community-authorized upgrade. This demonstrates meaningful freeze/override risk beyond ordinary admin keys. A compromised upgrade authority could potentially deploy malicious logic; compromised emergency authority could pause markets or alter recovery behavior. Direct admin draining is unverified. Architecture: Users → Pool shared objects → CLMM package → GlobalConfig / Partner / RewardVault; upgrade authority → package version; emergency response → protocol pause plus Sui validator governance. Fields remain null where current deployment-level verification is unavailable.

Additional CLMM contract audit focused on updated Cetus CLMM codebase following exploit period, as announced by Cetus in October 2025.

Cetus announced it completed another round of CLMM contract audit with AsymptoticTech and said no substantial risks were identified. The announcement did not include a public report URL in the result set, so the detailed findings, fix status, and whether the review covered deployed code are not verifiable as of 2026-08-29.

Cetus Farming Smart Contract Audit Report.

Cetus Audit Report — MoveBit, June 2025.

Cetus Concentrated Liquidity Protocol — Sui Contract Audit Report.

Cetus Concentrated Liquidity Protocol — Aptos Audit Report.

Cetus CLMM security audit report; newly verified publication listing for Asymptotic formal-verification/audit engagement.

CetusProtocol Security Assessment.

Cetus Sui CLMM Audit.

After the May 2025 exploit, Cetus said it would re-examine upgraded contracts and conduct joint audits with the Sui security team and multiple auditing firms before gradually resuming CLMM services. The available sources mention revalidation of upgraded contracts, additional audits, and regular security reports, but they do not provide a public audit report with severity counts or a clear fix-status matrix.

Multiple audits of Cetus CLMM smart contracts on Aptos and Sui (Move language), focused on concentrated liquidity AMM logic and protocol security posture.

Cetus stated in its Feb. 2023 report that the Aptos CLMM smart contract was double audited by OtterSec and MoveBit. It also said the Sui CLMM code base had been submitted for initial audit, and in Mar. 2023 that the Sui CLMM was being audited by both firms before mainnet launch.

Post‑deployment security assessment of CetusProtocol following major Sui CLMM exploit, focusing on upgraded contracts, patches, and overall security posture.

Cetus CLMM appears to be led by founder/co‑founder Henry Du, with a largely non‑transparent, semi‑public team structure and no clear evidence of a traditional, onshore operating company or physical office. ### Founders & core contributors

• Multiple independent sources state that Henry Du is the founder or co‑founder of Cetus Protocol.
• A 2026 explainer and CMC profile both name him explicitly as founder, responsible for developing a permissionless, composable liquidity protocol on Aptos and Sui.
• OKX Ventures’ investment announcement quotes Henry Du, Co‑founder of Cetus, in an official capacity, supporting founder status and some public presence.
• A separate LinkedIn profile lists Chok Hoo (Dubai‑based) as “Core Contributor – Cetus Protocol”, suggesting at least part of the team operates from the UAE, but he is not described as a founder. ### Team transparency, prior track record, and credibility
• Main educational and marketing articles repeatedly describe “Cetus Labs” or an experienced DeFi team but do not name other specific founders, executives, or engineers.
• One educational article explicitly states that “specifics regarding the Cetus Protocol founders and core staff are not well known”, confirming limited public detail beyond Henry Du.
• There is no independent evidence in retrieved sources of major prior projects, hacks, or formal corporate history linked to Henry Du or Cetus Labs; most content focuses on product features and partnerships.
• Credibility signals:
• Backing from OKX Ventures and integration with Coinbase’s on‑ramp, both of which highlight Henry Du as co‑founder and partner.
• Smart contracts reportedly audited by OtterSec and MoveBit (Aptos/Sui CLMM), but these are mentioned only in Cetus’ own Medium posts and therefore count as *unverified marketing claims* until cross‑checked. ### Public vs. anon; office, jurisdiction, “real business” check
• Founder Henry Du is public‑facing by name, but there is no clear, independently verified corporate entity, registered jurisdiction, or physical office address associated with Cetus Protocol in non‑Cetus sources as of 2026‑09‑04.
• A contributor’s LinkedIn indicates activity from Dubai, hinting at an offshore / UAE‑linked team, but this is not corroborated with company registration data.
• Several sources refer to “Cetus Labs” as the building entity, yet provide no legal entity details (no LLC, foundation, or company registry references). Reality check:
• Governance, ownership structure, and legal setup are Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04 from independent sources.
• Overall, Cetus CLMM looks like a real, operating DeFi product with meaningful ecosystem backing (OKX, Coinbase, Sui/Aptos integrations), but it remains founder‑identified yet institutionally opaque: single named founder, otherwise largely anonymous/low‑visibility team, and unclear corporate/onshore footprint.

Cetus CLMM has a generally strong *product* reputation in the Move ecosystem: it is widely described as a leading CLMM/DEX on Sui and Aptos, and it is credited with helping pioneer concentrated liquidity in that environment. Its public risk profile changed sharply after the May 2025 exploit, which multiple independent sources describe as a roughly $223M drain caused by a math/overflow vulnerability; that incident is the dominant criticism and the main unresolved reputational issue. On *sentiment*, coverage is mixed: some sources call it a legitimate, well-audited protocol with strong ecosystem importance, while also flagging high risk from novelty, a small track record, and systemic dependency for Sui DeFi.

Post-hack commentary is cautious rather than dismissive; sources note the protocol resumed operations and that trust will take time to rebuild. On *founders/investors*, I could not verify a reliable, independent list of founders or backers from the provided sources. Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

On *auditors*, external commentary repeatedly references audits and names OtterSec and Zellic as auditors associated with Cetus, but the strongest evidence here is that audits did not prevent the 2025 exploit, so “audited” should not be read as “low risk.” On *fraud/rug/insolvency allegations*, the sources provided do not substantiate a rug-pull or outright fraud claim. The confirmed issue is a major exploit; one source says legal action had been initiated in multiple jurisdictions and law enforcement agencies were involved, but that is not the same as a regulatory finding of fraud. On *legal/regulatory/sanctions*, I found no verified sanctions designation or formal regulator enforcement action in the provided material.

Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Main *unresolved concerns*: security hardening after a catastrophic exploit, concentration of ecosystem dependence on a single liquidity venue, and whether the protocol’s recovery has fully restored durable user confidence.

Economic Model — Cetus CLMM (as of September 6, 2026)

• Strategy/assets in/out: Concentrated-liquidity LPs deposit a selected token pair (e.g., SUI/CETUS) into a user-defined price range represented by a position NFT. Fees accrue separately in the pool’s input tokens and can be collected without withdrawing liquidity. Outflows are the two pool assets, accrued fees, and any farm rewards.
• Yield source: Primarily organic swap fees from in-range trading. Farm/liquidity-mining rewards, where offered, are subsidy-like and separate from trading yield. Current example: a Sui CETUS-SUI pool shows 22.57% supply APY, comprising 19.18% base and 3.39% CETUS rewards; this is pool-specific, not protocol-wide.
• Risk profile: Not market-neutral. LPs have impermanent-loss, inventory, range-selection, adverse-selection, and out-of-range risks; positions earn no fees while inactive. Returns are therefore directional to the pair and active range.
• Leverage/external exposure: Native CLMM positions are unlevered spot LP positions; no borrowing, looping, restaking, or external collateral is intrinsic to the product. leverage_ratio: null (protocol-wide leverage cannot be independently verified).
• Lock-ups/withdrawals: No protocol-wide lock-up identified. Users can remove liquidity with slippage limits, collect fees independently, and close the position; farm-staked positions require reward harvesting/unstaking mechanics. No withdrawal gate or protocol withdrawal fee was identified.
• Fees/revenue: Permissionless fee tiers range from 0.01% to 4%; 20% of swap fees is the default protocol share, with the balance paid to LPs. DefiLlama reports Cetus parent 30-day fees of $454,028 and protocol revenue of $90,809.
• TVL: DefiLlama’s CLMM ranking shows $24.96m TVL, 2 chains, $71.89m 7-day volume, and $22,057 7-day revenue. Parent Cetus chain data shows Sui $24.36m and Aptos $39,457; this is not a clean CLMM-only split. CLMM product-by-chain and trend reconciliation versus Dune: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 (Dune unavailable).
• APY sustainability: Fee yield is volume- and range-dependent; reward yield is subsidy-dependent and can disappear. Full APY history/volatility across all pools: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Contradiction: Previously recorded ~$70m CLMM TVL is not supported by the current DefiLlama snapshot; current CLMM TVL is ~$24.96m. The on-chain figure is unavailable for adjudication. organic_yield_pct: null

As of September 6, 2026, Cetus CLMM reserves/treasury are not quantitatively verifiable. Dune access was unavailable in this run; therefore Aptos and Sui treasury addresses, balances, token composition, and chain-by-chain exposure are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. No reliable public attestation or reserve report was identified. Policy and composition: Cetus documentation states that 20% of CLMM swap fees is taken as a protocol fee for a sustainable project treasury; this is an unverified marketing claim, not evidence of accumulated reserves.

Tokenomics separately describes a 15% “Liquidity Treasury” allocation for initial and long-term CEX/DEX liquidity, but this is an allocation schedule rather than a current balance. The xCETUS documentation further states that forfeited redemption amounts go to an “Eco Treasury” and that protocol-fee income is divided among stakers, loan repayment, and protocol income; no address or balance is disclosed. Custody/control: Cetus documentation says the deployed CLMM contracts are user-operated and that the original deploying entity does not custody user assets. Separately, after the May 2025 exploit, a recovery trust wallet was described as a 4-of-6 multisig: two Cetus signers, two Sui Foundation signers, and two OtterSec signers.

That arrangement relates to recovered/frozen exploit funds, not necessarily the ordinary operating treasury. The wallet address and current balance were not verified here. Liabilities: A Sui Foundation loan formed part of the 2025 recovery plan, but the amount, outstanding balance, repayment schedule, and current liability were not consistently disclosed in the sources reviewed. Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Contradiction / limitation: Published token-allocation and fee-policy figures should not be treated as reserve balances. No independently verified treasury asset total, address set, custody statement, or attestation was found.

Cetus CLMM — tokenomics snapshot (4 September 2026)

• Native token: Cetus Token (CETUS). Sui coin type: 0x06864a6f921804860930db6ddbe2e16acdf8504495ea7481637a1c8b9a8fe54b::cetus::CETUS. An Aptos token address is Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Supply/valuation: maximum and total supply: 1.0bn CETUS; circulating: ~960.86m (96.1%). CoinMarketCap reports approximately $22.7m market cap and $23.7m FDV; values are aggregator data, not on-chain verified.
• Allocation: community/farming and liquidity incentives 50%; team/advisors 20% (12-month cliff, 24-month monthly vesting); investors 15% (6-month cliff, 12-month monthly vesting); liquidity treasury 15%.
• Utility/governance: CETUS can be converted 1:1 into non-transferable xCETUS. xCETUS provides staking rewards, launchpad/loyalty benefits and governance voting over protocol parameters, including fees and mining allocation. Governance is stated to activate after circulating supply reaches 90%.
• Revenue share: disclosed staking economics are 50% of CLMM net profit to xCETUS stakers and 25% of DLMM net profit; the remainder is allocated to protocol income and Sui Foundation loan repayment. No verified CETUS buyback or burn program was found.
• Emissions/unlocks: published schedules imply a five-year release, with the majority already unlocked; DeFiLlama reports 96.72% unlocked and a latest team/advisor cliff unlock of 8.33m CETUS on April 2, 2026. Whether each announced unlock actually occurred on-chain is Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Control risk: mint, blacklist/freeze, fee-switch functions and controlling administrators are Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026 without raw-chain inspection.
• Concentration/insiders: top-holder percentages and insider-wallet attribution are Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Liquidity/listings: DeFiLlama reports TVL of about $23.6m: Sui ~99.8%, Aptos ~0.2%. Main observed markets include Cetus CETUS/SUI and CEX pairs on Binance, OKX, Gate, MEXC and Bitget; CoinGecko shows Binance as the largest listed market. Reported Binance CETUS/USDT ±2% depth was only roughly $28k bid / $45k ask, indicating thin institutional execution capacity.

A Bitcoin move below $10,000 would likely be a severe *risk-off* shock for Cetus CLMM, but the main protocol effect is not protocol insolvency; it is LP position impairment, fee compression, and much thinner usable liquidity in BTC-linked pools. Cetus CLMM is a concentrated-liquidity AMM, so LP capital is deployed only within chosen price bands; if price moves far outside a position’s range, that position becomes inactive and earns no fees. For Aptos and Sui, the stress would transmit through the same mechanism: pools containing BTC or BTC-correlated assets would see liquidity migrate or go inactive as price leaves LP ranges, widening slippage for traders and reducing fee generation for LPs.

That means the most exposed pools are the ones with tight ranges around BTC, wrapped BTC, and BTC-stable pairs; broad-market pairs would still be pressured indirectly through lower TVL and weaker trading activity, but the exact chain-by-chain exposure is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. A plausible stress path is: BTC crashes, volatility spikes, LPs pull capital or stop rebalancing, out-of-range positions stop earning fees, and market depth deteriorates further, creating a feedback loop of higher slippage and lower fee income. If the shock is accompanied by a broader crypto selloff, Cetus pools could experience rapid liquidity fragmentation because CLMM design rewards active management and penalizes passive narrow-range provisioning.

One important constraint: the provided sources do not verify current chain-specific TVL, pool composition, or BTC exposure for Cetus CLMM, so any precise loss estimate would be speculative. Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

Cetus CLMM is a concentrated-liquidity AMM on Aptos and Sui, but a 20% depeg stress on the largest collateral is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available web results because no on-chain collateral, vault, or liquidation data was provided and on-chain verification is unavailable in this run. The only clearly supported risk-relevant fact is that Cetus CLMM suffered a major exploit in May 2025 due to a math overflow in liquidity accounting, which affected multiple pools and is relevant to protocol resilience analysis. Given the absence of verifiable exposure data, I cannot quantify losses, liquidation shortfall, or chain-by-chain impact for Aptos vs.

Sui. I also cannot confirm what asset is the “largest collateral” for Cetus CLMM, so any numeric stress result would be speculation. What can be said from the sourced material is limited to protocol context: Cetus is a CLMM design with fee-based revenue and concentrated liquidity mechanics, and the documented exploit showed that reserve drainage can occur when liquidity math fails under adversarial conditions.

If you want a usable stress estimate, I would need current collateral composition, borrow/lend or vault exposure, and per-chain TVL from a verifiable dataset; otherwise the correct output remains: Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

For Cetus CLMM, the relevant “top counterparty insolvent” stress is not a traditional OTC credit exposure; it is an on-chain liquidity-provider insolvency / failure-to-fund scenario in which the largest LP or token side of a pool cannot honor its position. Cetus CLMM is a concentrated-liquidity AMM, so user losses propagate through pool math rather than a bilateral credit contract. Aptos: Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. I did not find a reliable source in the provided results showing a production Cetus CLMM deployment, pool architecture, or loss-allocation rules on Aptos specifically. Sui: In the documented incident, the CLMM contract vulnerability let an attacker mint artificially high liquidity, then remove liquidity and drain pool reserves across pools; the loss path was therefore pool-reserve depletion, not an external insolvency waterfall.

The smart-contract impact path was: flawed overflow check in checked_shlw/fixed-point math → inflated liquidity accounting → acceptance of liquidity removal → direct withdrawal of pool assets. Who absorbs the loss: the LPs in the affected pools absorb the economic loss first, because reserves are depleted when positions are removed against corrupted accounting. Traders/swappers are affected secondarily through halted or degraded pool functionality, price dislocation, and reduced available liquidity. Compensation: the provided results do not show a verified, protocol-level compensation scheme, insurance fund, or explicit make-whole mechanism for this stress case. Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Impact path through contracts: core CLMM math library → position/liquidity accounting → add-liquidity / remove-liquidity flows → pool reserve state → user withdrawal outcomes. Important distinction: this is an exploit / accounting failure path, not a clear counterparty-default waterfall with recovery rates or creditor hierarchy like the Fed counterparty-default framework.

For the fraud-by-DAO/owners stress scenario, I found no verifiable evidence that Cetus’ DAO or owners intentionally committed fraud; the available sources instead describe a smart-contract exploit against CLMM pools, not an insider theft or governance fraud. Cetus’ own incident report says the May 22, 2025 event was caused by a vulnerability in the CLMM contract stemming from an open-source library flaw, and multiple independent writeups describe the same root cause as an overflow/math bug exploited by an external attacker. The strongest contrary signal is the governance response after the hack: Sui validators voted to restore the frozen funds to affected users, which is evidence of emergency remediation at the chain/governance layer, not proof of fraud by Cetus owners.

The sources provided do not show a DAO vote to misappropriate assets, a malicious admin upgrade, or owner-directed diversion of user funds. Assessment: fraud by DAO/owners is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. If you need a stricter risk label for this stress case, the observable event is better classified as external exploit / contract failure rather than insider fraud.

Cetus CLMM has a negative primary yield source in the last 30 days if you define primary yield as swap-fee revenue, because Cetus charges a protocol fee from CLMM swap fees to support the treasury, so fee generation is the core yield mechanism described in its docs. However, the provided results do not include a 30d fee or revenue series, so the negative-30d condition is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. What *is* verifiable from the results is that Cetus CLMM is a concentrated-liquidity AMM on Aptos and Sui, and that its ecosystem suffered a major May 2025 exploit that materially impacted trust and TVL.

Those sources support a stressed-risk interpretation, but they do not prove the requested 30d yield sign. The safest institutional read is: stress case = assume primary yield is negative / impaired until fee and volume data confirm recovery; the actual 30d negative status remains unverified from the supplied evidence.

Assessment as of September 13, 2026: Cetus CLMM has no independently evidenced, standing DAO that controls upgrades, treasury spending, developer appointments, frontend deployment, or company operations. xCETUS/veNFT is described as representing governance power and dividend participation, but no recurring proposal lifecycle or binding token-holder control over contracts was verified. Contracts/funds: upgrade authority, pause authority, admin roles, and whether any deployer/admin can move user funds are Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026 because Dune/on-chain verification is unavailable. The documented 4-of-6 wallet was a special recovery/trust wallet for the May 2025 exploit—not evidence of a standing Cetus treasury multisig.

Its proposed signers were two Cetus, two Sui Foundation, and two OtterSec representatives. Proposal process: one exceptional Sui validator governance vote was documented for recovery of frozen exploit funds. It was stake-weighted, required >50% participation excluding abstention and yes-stake greater than no-stake; it was not a recurring Cetus DAO process.

Independent analysis identified rushed voting, centralized coordination, and lack of a formal framework. Control map: the CetusProtocol GitHub organization maintains the public xCETUS SDK, while the official terms state that off-chain infrastructure, APIs, SDKs, routing, and other services may involve centralized components and may be changed or discontinued without prior notice. Company/legal disclosure: the Terms identify only “[Cetus entity / foundation name]”; no legal entity name, registration number, directors, or jurisdiction of incorporation is supplied.

The Terms select British Virgin Islands law and Singapore SIAC arbitration. This is insufficient to identify the operating company. Voting concentration and top holders via Dune: Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026.

DAO assessment: symbolic/insufficiently evidenced rather than operationally controlling.

As of September 4, 2026: Cetus identifies Cetus Technology Limited, a British Virgin Islands company, as the entity operating Cetus Protocol; a filed complaint states its principal place of business is in the BVI and that it conducts substantial U.S. business. However, the current Terms of Use (last updated March 1, 2026) still contain the unresolved placeholder “[Cetus entity / foundation name]”. This is a material legal-documentation weakness. Terms/restrictions: The Terms characterize the protocol as decentralized, permissionless, non-custodial and not a transaction counterparty; users bear legal-compliance and asset risks.

BVI law governs, with SIAC arbitration in Singapore, and liability is capped at USD 200. The legacy token disclaimer excludes U.S., Canadian and PRC persons from token distributions where securities/financial-service restrictions may apply, and permits identity verification if requested. The current protocol Terms do not state a comprehensive jurisdiction blacklist. KYC/AML and data protection: No general KYC/AML onboarding regime is disclosed for permissionless CLMM access.

KYC is mentioned only in the legacy token-distribution disclaimer. A dedicated Cetus privacy policy, retention schedule, GDPR/CCPA notice, or named data controller was not located: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Classification: Cetus’s own documents say CETUS is a utility/governance token and that the protocol is not offering securities or regulated services; these are unverified marketing/legal-position claims, not regulator determinations. The legal classification of the protocol, CETUS, liquidity provision and fee activity remains jurisdiction-specific: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Warnings/enforcement/courts: No regulator enforcement action against Cetus or Cetus Technology Limited was identified in the reviewed sources.

A private U.S. action exists: Cetus Technology Limited v. Circle Internet Group and Doe defendants, concerning recovery of assets following the May 22, 2025 exploit; it is not regulatory enforcement. The case remained active procedurally in April 2026.

No sanctions designation of the protocol/entity was identified in the reviewed sources. Actual risk is higher than the “decentralized/no-control” framing suggests: the entity operates interfaces and pursued litigation, while the exploit and recovery actions demonstrate practical operational and U.S. litigation exposure.

No exact GLEIF LEI record for 'Cetus Technology Limited', 'Cetus CLMM'. OFAC SDN screening of 'Cetus Technology Limited', 'Cetus CLMM': no match. SEC litigation and administrative release feeds: no mention.

Cetus CLMM does not appear to issue its own stablecoin. The available evidence only shows that Cetus is a CLMM DEX that supports stablecoin trading pairs, and no protocol-issued stable asset is documented in the gathered sources. A stablecoin depeg event used by Cetus is not verifiable as of 2026-09-06, so depeg_count, last_depeg_date, and max_depeg_pct remain unknown.

Cetus CLMM has elevated smart-contract and governance risk following the May 22, 2025 Sui exploit, which used a flaw in an external arithmetic library and drained approximately $223 million from CLMM pools. Concentrated-liquidity market risk and multi-chain operational dependencies remain material; current Aptos/Sui TVL, exposure splits, and post-relaunch on-chain controls are Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026 because Dune verification is unavailable.

Cetus CLMM’s top strengths are: capital efficiency from concentrated liquidity, since LPs can place funds in specific price ranges instead of across the full curve; better execution quality through tighter liquidity and lower slippage; advanced LP flexibility because multiple positions can coexist in the same pool with different ranges and fee tiers; multi-chain reach on both Aptos and Sui, which broadens market access; and permissionless/composable design, allowing others to build pools and integrate Cetus liquidity into other applications. A further practical strength is its Move-ecosystem positioning on Aptos and Sui, which are described by several sources as high-throughput, low-latency chains well suited to trading workloads.