Franklin Templeton BENJI

Green · 71/100

Executive summary

Franklin Templeton BENJI is a tokenized share class of the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), a regulated U.S. money market fund, scoring 71/100 (green band) with high data confidence (91/100).

  • Security: Trail of Bits conducted four audits (2023-05, 2025-02, 2025-10, 2026-04) identifying 44 total findings including 4 high-severity issues in the 2023 money-market review (DoS vectors, multisig bypass, insufficient validation) and 2 medium issues in the 2026 differential review (owner token pulls, fee-on-transfer trapping); fix status and deployed-bytecode coverage are not verifiable as of September 2026. No active bug bounty program identified.
  • Governance & custody: Not a DAO; governed by Franklin Templeton Trust board and transfer agent with unilateral control over wallet whitelisting, transaction corrections, freezes, and migrations. Ethereum proxy at 0x3DDc84940Ab509C11B20B76B466933f40b750dc9 is upgradeable; admin structure, multisig threshold, and timelock details are not verifiable. JPMorgan Chase serves as custodian for underlying fund assets.
  • Top risks: Centralized permissioned control (transfer agent can freeze/correct/migrate); smart-contract upgrade risk (proxy admin details unverified); counterparty exposure to repo markets and bank custodians despite 102% collateralization; regulatory/operational dependency on Franklin Templeton infrastructure; no independent on-chain verification of reserves or bytecode matching available.
  • Strengths: Regulated U.S. Investment Company Act structure with $753.24M fund NAV (June 2026); 99.5%+ allocation to U.S. government securities and repos; SEC no-action letter (August 2026) permits other Franklin funds to invest; peer-to-peer 24/7 transfers between approved wallets; daily/intraday yield accrual; multi-chain deployment; institutional-grade sponsor with $1.3-1.6T AUM.
  • Incidents: No verified fraud, depeg, hack, or insolvency events identified in available sources as of September 2026.
  • Unverified: Deployed-bytecode audit coverage, proxy admin address and signer threshold, on-chain reserve reconciliation, exact counterparty exposures, fix implementation for all audit findings, and current Ethereum circulating supply cannot be independently confirmed from provided sources.
  • Recommended exposure: Conservative allocation (≤5-10% of stablecoin/cash-equivalent bucket) for institutional allocators comfortable with permissioned, centralized custody and transfer-agent control; suitable only for KYC-compliant, whitelisted wallets; monitor SEC filings, fund NAV, and Franklin Templeton operational disclosures; treat as regulated money-market exposure, not decentralized DeFi; verify wallet eligibility and redemption process before deployment.
  • Open questions: Confirm current Ethereum proxy admin (EOA vs. multisig, signer identities, timelock delay); obtain itemized audit remediation evidence and bytecode-match verification; review latest fund portfolio holdings and repo counterparty concentration; clarify emergency pause/migration procedures and historical use; verify on-chain reserve addresses and reconciliation to fund NAV; assess transfer-agent operational controls and disaster-recovery plans.

Score

Component Weight Raw Points Reason
Security 20% 80 16.0 4 audit(s); no fresh audit; no qualifying bug bounty
Audits 20% 100 20.0 full audit within 365 days (latest 2026-04-01)
Incidents 20% 100 20.0 no open incidents
Governance 20% 75 15.0 a single party can withdraw funds (admin_can_drain)
TVL 20% 0 0.0 TVL unavailable on DeFiLlama
Data confidence 91 7/7 critical categories; 18/34 verified facts; 34/34 fresh (180d)

Identification

protocol identification

two sources

Franklin Templeton BENJI is the onchain share/tokenization layer for the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), a tokenized money market fund; Franklin’s Benji pages describe it as blockchain-powered investments and state that one BENJI token represents one fund share. The Ethereum deployment is publicly listed by Franklin Templeton on its Benji DevHub, which shows the Ethereum BENJI fund token address as 0x3DDc84940Ab509C11B20B76B466933f40b750dc9, and CoinGecko independently matches the same Ethereum contract address.

The protocol is categorized as a tokenized money market fund / tokenized traditional fund, not a native DeFi lending or DEX protocol. Launch / chains: BENJI launched initially in 2021 on Stellar, later expanded to Polygon in 2023, and was expanded to Ethereum in November 2024 according to Franklin coverage and crypto media. Public sources also report subsequent multi-chain expansion to Arbitrum, Avalanche, Aptos, Base, Solana, and BNB Chain, but I could not independently verify all of those here, so for this request the verifiable Ethereum presence is confirmed and the broader chain set is best treated as partially unverified from the gathered sources. Native token: BENJI is the share token itself; no separate native governance token is identified in the gathered sources. Main contracts on Ethereum: Franklin’s DevHub lists the BENJI fund token and supporting modules (token registry, authorization, transactional), while the only contract independently cross-checked here is the fund token address 0x3DDc84940Ab509C11B20B76B466933f40b750dc9. Explorer verification status for the contract is reported by third-party sources as Etherscan-verified, but I did not directly inspect the explorer in this run, so that status is not fully verifiable as of 2026-09-03. Fork lineage: BENJI is not presented in the gathered sources as a fork of an upstream DeFi protocol; it is Franklin Templeton’s proprietary tokenization platform.

I found no verified evidence of fork-specific code changes, upstream comparisons, or fork-audit history, and no malicious-modification history tied to BENJI itself in the gathered sources. Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03.

Evidence (8)

maturity

two sources

BENJI looks like a real, mature product portal rather than a thin landing page: Franklin Templeton’s page points to a dedicated Benji platform with a dev hub, contract list, and explicit API references, and Franklin Templeton says BENJI is accessible through a mobile app for retail users and a web portal for institutional users. The product is not a permissionless DeFi app; it is an institutional/retail tokenized fund workflow with KYC/allowlisted access, so the UX is closer to a financial-services portal than a typical crypto dApp. Live deposits and redemptions are supported in the sense of actual subscription/redemption rails: Franklin Templeton and a partner announcement describe purchase and redemption flows, including USDC funding rails and near-real-time settlement for institutional wallets.

That said, the exact on-chain mechanics of deposits/withdrawals on Ethereum are not verifiable as of 2026-09-03 from the gathered sources alone, and the user-facing flow appears to settle off-chain through the app/portal rather than via a fully permissionless smart-contract vault. The site shows signs of a maintained product stack, not a template: there are active product pages, contract pages, and a development resources area with specific contract addresses. No broken-link audit was performed here, so broken links or template artifacts are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03.

On open API: yes, Franklin Templeton explicitly advertises an API and a “Benji Dev Hub” on the Benji platform page. However, the exact scope, auth model, and public accessibility of that API are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03 from the available sources.

Evidence (4)

Security

bug bounty

two sources

Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03. No active bug bounty program for Franklin Templeton BENJI was found in the retrieved sources. A third-party security-status page explicitly labels BENJI as having 'No (internal)' bug bounty, while the Franklin Templeton BENJI product page and the Trail of Bits review do not describe any public bounty program.

The only verified security artifact found was a Trail of Bits differential review published in April 2026, which reported 7 findings (2 medium, 3 low, 2 informational), but this is an audit/review result, not a bug bounty result.

Active
No
Evidence (3)

counterparty risks

one source

As of September 5, 2026, no active dependency failure, depeg, bridge exploit, oracle incident, custodian insolvency, or issuer default was identified in the reviewed sources; however, live on-chain verification was unavailable: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Risk assessment

  • RWA issuer/SPV: BENJI represents shares of the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), a registered government money-market fund—not a DeFi lending or yield strategy. The fund targets at least 99.5% in U.S. government securities, cash, and fully collateralized repurchase agreements. It is not FDIC-insured, U.S.-government-guaranteed, or contractually supported by Franklin Templeton.
  • Custody/counterparties: JPMorgan Chase is identified as custodian. Repo transactions create residual bank/broker-dealer counterparty risk despite minimum collateralization of 102% (100% for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York); collateral liquidation, insolvency, and settlement delays remain possible.
  • Blockchain/transfer-agent dependency: The transfer agent controls the permissioned token system, wallet whitelisting, corrective transactions, and transfer restrictions. Loss or compromise of keys, transfer-agent systems, or blockchain infrastructure could impair transfers/redemptions. The prospectus permits migration to another approved network after a prolonged failure.
  • Ethereum/bridges/oracles: No external DeFi protocol, oracle, stablecoin, LST/restaking, or bridge dependency is disclosed as essential to FOBXX’s investment strategy. Ethereum is only one conditionally approved network; Stellar is described as the primary network in the current prospectus. There is no evidence here of a canonical bridge or oracle-mediated NAV mechanism. On-chain exposure and any bridge/CEX/MM balances: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026.
  • Failure scenarios: severe repo-counterparty default, custodian/transfer-agent outage, blockchain congestion or exploit, key compromise, cyberattack, large redemptions, or Treasury-rate/liquidity stress could delay redemption or push NAV below $1.00. Contradiction callout: The supplied chain designation is Ethereum, but the current prospectus states Stellar is primary and Ethereum access is eligibility-based. The prospectus—not the chain label—controls this dependency assessment. Structured fields dependency_failure_active: null max_exposure_pct: null
Evidence (2)

crypto custody

two sources

BENJI’s crypto custody is organized as a hybrid transfer-agent / wallet-control structure rather than simple investor self-custody. Franklin Templeton’s materials say the Benji platform is the official record of ownership, while blockchain wallets are used for transaction activity; the SEC filing and recent coverage indicate Franklin Templeton Investor Services / the affiliated transfer agent controls or administers the wallet structure and official shareholder records, while the fund’s assets remain with the underlying custodian arrangement. This is not verifiable as a fully on-chain custody model from the available sources, and no evidence shows a free-withdrawal, self-custodial setup.

On the available evidence, withdrawals are not shown as paused, and segregated-assets status is not clearly disclosed in a way that can be verified here.

Withdrawal paused
No
Evidence (3)

key management

two sources

BENJI’s key management is organized around Franklin Templeton’s transfer-agent/recordkeeping stack, not around a decentralized multi-signer DAO-style model. Franklin Templeton says its transfer agent maintains the official share register through a proprietary blockchain-integrated system, and that the system uses public blockchains only for transaction activity. The Stellar case study says Franklin Templeton directly authorizes wallets after KYC, so only approved wallets can receive BENJI, and it can execute clawbacks when required.

The suitability framework also describes public-key whitelisting as the permission control mechanism, indicating that wallet access is centrally approved and maintained.\n\nIndependent reporting on the SEC no-action letter adds that Franklin Templeton Investor Services creates the wallets for registered funds, retains control of the corresponding private keys, and that the affiliated transfer agent keeps the official shareholder record and administrative controls. That same reporting says the structure is designed so the transfer agent can correct blockchain errors and, if the transfer agent changes, admin keys and controls must be transferred to the successor. In short, key management is centralized and institutional, with Franklin Templeton controlling wallet authorization, private-key custody for registered-fund wallets, and administrative recovery powers.

Evidence (5)

smart-contract

two sources

Assessment — Ethereum (as of September 5, 2026) Addresses / verification. Official Franklin Templeton DevHub lists the BENJI fund-token proxy as 0x3DDc84940Ab509C11B20B76B466933f40b750dc9. Listed associated modules are Registry 0xD7644d80575678C027CED844bbeEF5Ad12277d40, Token Registry 0x14DD78f8Ca45231dCe301AdEae179dcbEE40427E, Authorization 0x55dd370DeDe1AD474d3543Be06452615d3B5b162, Transactional 0x648a6e41B4e445506b848cE49FfEF827651ab4f5, Transfer Agent 0x8C8Bfc3151C2161a4baD77268e246A08e5D9c666, Intent Validation 0xBA5314385d4A849f8D8dBFb867b67547683F8a93, and MultiSig 0xA2Bd91Fb0c8258134706629edf7464C14bAB8b66. Etherscan identifies the fund-token address as a verified ERC1967Proxy, with current implementation 0x20ca56F1215c3376B25bBa1f2F9D3701c5dEF4C5; historical Upgraded events show prior implementations.

This confirms an upgradeable proxy architecture, apparently using the transparent-proxy admin interface. Admin / control risk. The fund is explicitly permissioned: wallets are whitelisted, the transfer agent can limit transfers and correct unauthorized or erroneous ownership records, and administrative clawback/balance control is a stated design requirement. Exact proxy-admin address, whether it is an EOA, multisig, or timelock, signer threshold, role holders, pause/upgrade/fee/oracle/strategy functions, renounced roles, and an on-chain timelock delay: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Dune was unavailable; no Dune query/execution evidence is available. Exit / worst case. Users do not have a credibly permissionless exit: redemption is subject to Franklin/transfer-agent eligibility and operational processing.

If privileged keys were compromised, the plausible worst case is transfer freezing, whitelist manipulation, unauthorized mint/burn or balance correction, and malicious implementation upgrade. Direct “drain” of the underlying fund is Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026; token-record manipulation and freeze risk are material. Architecture: Investor wallet → BENJI ERC1967 proxy → implementation; administrative modules → registry/authorization/transfer/transaction controls; off-chain transfer agent/fund records → redemption and corrections. Conclusion: High centralized admin and upgrade risk; low evidence of a permissionless DeFi design. Audit report and privileged-key safeguards remain unconfirmed.

Upgradeable
Yes
Evidence (5)

audit

two sources

Published Trail of Bits differential security review for Franklin Templeton BenjiSwap on Ethereum/EVM. The review reports seven findings.

Auditor
Trail of Bits
Report date
2026-04
Scope
Ethereum/EVM; differential review of BenjiSwap changes. Reviewed source-code differences; deployed-bytecode equivalence is not established.
Findings
7 findings: Critical 0; High 0; Medium 2; Low 3; Informational 2. Medium findings: owner-controlled token pulls through active swap approvals; fee-on-transfer tokens becoming trapped in the treasury.
Fix status
Trail of Bits’ publications index marks the report with a fix-review indicator, but an independently accessible, itemized remediation disposition was not located. Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Covers deployed code: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026; no bytecode-match evidence was available.
Report url
https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2026-04-franklintempleton-benjiswap-differentialreview.pdf
Report id
doc:73ec76fcf9ed5567
Evidence (2)

audit

two sources

Published Trail of Bits security review for the Franklin Templeton BenjiSwap contract on Ethereum/EVM. The auditor reports two findings.

Auditor
Trail of Bits
Report date
2025-10
Scope
Ethereum/EVM; BenjiSwap contract. Source-code review; deployed-bytecode equivalence is not established.
Findings
2 findings: Critical 0; High 0; Medium 0; Low 1; Informational 1. Findings: EOA per-transaction cap bypass through multicall; treasury deposit/withdraw functions lacking token-registration and unsupported-token checks.
Fix status
Trail of Bits’ publications index marks the report with a fix-review indicator, but an independently accessible, itemized remediation disposition was not located. Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Covers deployed code: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026; no bytecode-match evidence was available.
Report url
https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2025-10-franklintempleton-benjiswapcontract-securityreview.pdf
Report id
doc:82987a72530b6021
Evidence (2)

audit

two sources

Published Trail of Bits security review for Franklin Templeton’s Ethereum/EVM money-market smart contracts. The Trail of Bits library records 15 findings and identifies the review as Ethereum/EVM.

Auditor
Trail of Bits
Report date
2023-05
Scope
Ethereum/EVM; Benji/FOBXX money-market contracts, including IntentValidationModule and multisignature components. Source review scope is code-level; deployed-bytecode equivalence is not established.
Findings
15 findings: Critical 0; High 4; Medium 3; Low 3; Informational 4; Undetermined 1. High findings included denial-of-service vectors, insufficient intent validation, a multisignature threshold bypass, and shareholders preventing deauthorization.
Fix status
Trail of Bits’ publications index marks the report with a fix-review indicator, but an independently accessible, itemized remediation disposition was not located. Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Covers deployed code: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026; no bytecode-match evidence was available.
Report url
https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/2023-05-franklintempleton-moneymarket-securityreview.pdf
Report id
doc:fdffeb0ee69c92ff
Evidence (2)

Team & Reputation

founders

two sources

BENJI is not a standalone anonymous DeFi startup; it is the on-chain token/share class for Franklin Templeton’s Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), operated through Franklin Templeton’s proprietary Benji Technology Platform. The credible public faces are Franklin Templeton executives and product teams, not pseudonymous founders: Roger Bayston is identified as head of digital assets, Sandy Kaul as head of innovation, and the fund page attributes the product to Franklin Templeton Fixed Income.

Franklin Templeton is a large, publicly traded California-based asset manager (Franklin Resources, NYSE: BEN) with offices in major financial markets and over 1,500 investment professionals, which strongly supports a real-business, regulated-firm profile rather than a web-front or offshore shell. A strict founder list is not clearly disclosed in the sources I found; for this reason, the protocol’s “founders” are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03. What is verifiable is institutional sponsorship by Franklin Templeton, SEC-registered fund structure, and long-running operation since 2021.

I found no evidence in the gathered sources of anonymous leadership, prior hack history, or a suspicious offshore-only setup; instead, the available evidence points to a conventional onshore U.S. asset-management business tokenizing a regulated money market fund. Reality check: the strongest independent signal is that multiple third parties describe BENJI as the tokenized/share-class representation of FOBXX and note its first-in-class regulated fund status, while Franklin Templeton’s own materials present the same structure. The remaining gaps are founder identity granularity and detailed team biographies, which are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03.

Evidence (8)

general reputation

two sources

Franklin Templeton’s BENJI / Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX) currently has a strong, institution‑grade reputation, with recent regulatory comfort from the SEC and no public fraud/rug/insolvency allegations identified. Protocol & issuer profile

  • BENJI is the on‑chain share class of FOBXX, a U.S.‑registered government money market mutual fund managed by Franklin Templeton, a global asset manager with about $1.3–1.6T AUM.
  • The fund invests at least 99.5% in U.S. government securities, cash, and repos fully collateralized by U.S. government securities or cash, aligning it with traditional “government” money market risk.
  • BENJI is positioned as the first U.S.-registered mutual fund to use a public blockchain as its official system of record, initially on Stellar and later expanded to Ethereum and other chains. Regulatory and legal stance
  • FOBXX/BENJI is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a U.S. mutual fund; this is repeatedly stated in issuer materials and independent coverage.
  • On 12 August 2026, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management issued a no‑action letter allowing Franklin Templeton’s own registered mutual funds and ETFs to invest in BENJI/FOBXX for cash management, subject to conditions on custody and recordkeeping.
  • The letter explicitly notes this is staff-level relief, not formal Commission approval or a legal ruling.
  • No public records or mainstream coverage in the gathered data suggest enforcement actions, sanctions, or insolvency issues specifically tied to BENJI. Audits, infrastructure, and partners
  • Public sources highlight collaboration with Stellar Development Foundation and multiple L1s (Ethereum, Polygon, Avalanche, Arbitrum, Solana, Base, Aptos, BNB Chain), reinforcing a perception of institutional infrastructure and due diligence.
  • Specific smart‑contract or systems‑security audit reports for BENJI were not surfaced in the retrieved data. Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04. Sentiment, criticisms, and unresolved concerns
  • Coverage in crypto/media outlets frames BENJI as a leading tokenized Treasury/money market product, emphasizing growth in AUM and multi‑chain deployment.
  • Identified criticisms are more structural than accusatory:
  • Centralization and reliance on a single large asset manager for on‑chain cash management.
  • Regulatory complexity: SEC relief is narrow and conditional, and explicitly *not* a broad approval of tokenized fund structures.
  • No specific fraud, rug pull, or customer‑loss controversies about BENJI were found in the reviewed materials. Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04 whether any minor technical incidents occurred. Overall, reputation risk today is dominated by issuer centralization, regulatory interpretation risk, and smart‑contract/operational opacity, rather than any documented misconduct or financial distress.
Evidence (15)

Economy

model

two sources

Assessment (reviewed September 5, 2026): BENJI is a permissioned tokenized share of Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), not a conventional DeFi yield strategy. The fund invests at least 99.5% in U.S. government securities, cash, and fully collateralized repos, with a 60-day maximum dollar-weighted average maturity.

Yield is portfolio income from Treasuries/repos, distributed through daily dividend accrual and newly minted BENJI—not emissions, liquidity mining, leverage, restaking, or looping. Risk/return model: Market-neutral in crypto terms and primarily short-duration rate exposure; directional exposure is to U.S. rates, sovereign/repo markets, NAV/liquidity, and operational/blockchain risks. No external DeFi collateral requirement or protocol-level borrowing was identified. Leverage/looping/restaking: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026; no such strategy is disclosed in the reviewed fund materials. Access and withdrawals: No stated lock-up.

Primary subscriptions/redemptions are processed through the Benji app or institutional portal during business days/NAV cycles. Peer-to-peer transfers can occur 24/7 between approved, permissioned wallets; they are not a public market and may occur away from NAV. The transfer agent can reject disruptive transactions, and the prospectus reserves the ability to impose a liquidity fee after notice. Fees/revenue: Gross expense ratio 0.22%; current net expense ratio 0.20% under a contractual limitation expiring July 31, 2027.

No performance, borrowing, or protocol fee was identified. The economic revenue is fund management income, not DeFi protocol revenue. Yield: 7-day effective yield 3.62% and current yield 3.56%, both as of August 6, 2026; one-year total return was 3.79% through June 30, 2026. Yield should be expected to move with short-term rates; historical APY volatility cannot be independently reconstructed here. TVL/exposure: Ethereum-specific on-chain TVL and chain allocation: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026 (Dune unavailable; no Dune query/execution IDs).

DeFiLlama displays BENJI active/on-chain market cap of $667.02m and $0 DeFi active TVL; RWA.xyz displays approximately $1.029b total asset value and 3.51% 7-day APY. Contradiction: RWA.xyz’s ~$1.029b versus Franklin’s reported $753.24m net assets as of June 30, 2026 and DeFiLlama’s $667.02m are materially inconsistent; the discrepancy is unresolved and should not be treated as verified Ethereum TVL.

Evidence (4)

reserves

one source

Assessment (as of September 5, 2026)

  • Reserve model: BENJI represents shares of the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), not a standalone DeFi treasury. The fund’s stated policy is to invest at least 99.5% of assets in U.S. government securities, cash, and fully collateralized repurchase agreements; it does not invest in native crypto assets.
  • Reported size: FOBXX reported $753.24 million total net assets as of June 30, 2026. This is fund NAV/assets, not a verified BENJI treasury or liquid-reserve balance.
  • Composition: Public materials disclose the permitted asset classes and portfolio holdings through fund reports, but an independently verified reserve breakdown for the BENJI token on Ethereum was not established.
  • Custody and control: Franklin Templeton Investor Services LLC (FTIS) acts as transfer agent and maintains the official shareholder record. FTIS controls permissioning, administrative smart-contract functions, wallet controls, and correction/freeze/migration procedures. The SEC no-action letter describes layered wallet security, including multisignature, MPC, distributed signers, and offline recovery.
  • Addresses / on-chain balances: Dune MCP was unavailable for this run. Ethereum contract addresses, treasury/custody addresses, token balances, and reconciliation to fund assets are therefore Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026.
  • Chain scope: Contradiction/caveat: Ethereum is supported only for eligible accounts upon request; the prospectus identifies Stellar as the primary network. Therefore, Ethereum should not be treated as the sole or default BENJI reserve venue.
  • Reserve policy / attestations: The fund is subject to registered-fund disclosures, Rule 2a-7 limits, shareholder reports, and SEC oversight. The SEC letter references annual independent-public-accountant verifications of transfer-agent records, but this is not a public, reserve-specific stablecoin attestation. A current reserve attestation proving on-chain BENJI balances equal underlying assets is Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Structured fields
  • liquid_reserves_usd: null
  • liabilities_usd: null
Evidence (3)

tokenomics

two sources

Assessment — BENJI is not a native DeFi/governance token. It is a permissioned tokenized share of the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX): 1 BENJI represents 1 fund share. Ethereum contract: 0x3DDc84940Ab509C11B20B76B466933f40b750dc9 (upgradeable proxy).

  • Supply / valuation: Supply is elastic and corresponds to fund shares. An Etherscan snapshot showed 47,903,327.34 BENJI on July 22, 2026; current Ethereum total and circulating supply: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Market cap and FDV are not meaningful/applicable because BENJI is not freely market-priced or permissionlessly tradable; CoinGecko reports no circulating-supply-based market cap. Fund net assets were $720.93m as of July 31, 2026—not BENJI market cap.
  • Utility / yield: Represents regulated money-market-fund ownership, redemption rights, permissioned wallet-to-wallet transfer, and daily yield. Yield is distributed as newly minted BENJI; redemptions burn BENJI. No DAO governance, voting rights, revenue share, buyback program, or staking rewards identified.
  • Emissions / unlocks / allocations: No fixed emissions or vesting schedule; issuance and burning follow subscriptions, redemptions, and dividend accrual. Team, investor, treasury, and community allocations are not applicable to this fund-share structure. Announced unlocks and whether they occurred on-chain: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
  • Admin controls: Whitelisted wallets, transfer restrictions, mint/burn, pause/administrative balance correction, and clawback capabilities are part of the design. Franklin Templeton’s transfer-agent infrastructure controls these functions through authorization, transfer-agent, transactional, intent-validation, and multisig modules; Etherscan confirms the proxy has been upgraded. Fee-switch function: Not identified.
  • Concentration / liquidity: Top holders, insider wallets, and concentration: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026 without Dune/on-chain query execution. No credible permissionless Ethereum DEX listing or measurable pool depth was identified; primary distribution is through Franklin Templeton’s Benji platform and institutional channels. DEX liquidity: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
Evidence (5)

Stress scenarios

stress scenario - bitcoin price falls below $10000

one source

BENJI is Franklin Templeton’s tokenized U.S. government money market fund share class, so a Bitcoin crash below $10,000 is not a direct NAV driver for the fund unless it triggers broader liquidity, redemptions, or market plumbing stress. Franklin Templeton states that BENJI/Fund shares can suffer material adverse effects during extreme volatility, including the possibility of losing all or substantially all value, and that the sponsor is not required to provide financial support even in periods of market stress. For this stress scenario, the main transmission channels would be indirect: a severe crypto drawdown could reduce risk appetite, impair stablecoin/crypto venue liquidity, and increase redemption pressure on tokenized cash products used as parking places for capital.

That said, a Bitcoin move below $10,000 alone does not imply BENJI impairment because the fund is primarily backed by government securities, not crypto assets. The appropriate risk view is therefore: direct price risk = low, indirect market-liquidity and redemption risk = elevated only in a broader systemic event. Franklin Templeton’s own disclosure language supports that BENJI is designed for money-market exposure, but it does not promise sponsor support in stress events.

Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03: chain-level BENJI holdings, Ethereum onchain AUM, and redemption concentration under this exact BTC shock, because on-chain verification is unavailable in this run.

Evidence (4)

stress scenario - largest collateral depegs 20%,

unverified

Under a stress scenario where BENJI itself depegs by 20%, the direct impact on a protocol using BENJI as collateral is that the collateral’s mark-to-market value falls by 20% immediately. The loss to the protocol depends on how much BENJI exposure it has and on the existing loan-to-value buffer, but the scenario is fundamentally a collateral-price shock rather than a fund-level default assumption. Franklin Templeton describes BENJI as the on-chain share class of the Franklin OnChain U.S.

Government Money Fund (FOBXX), a regulated money market fund, and states that the fund’s sponsor is not required to reimburse losses or provide financial support during market stress.

Evidence (3)

stress scenario - top counterparty insolvent — each with expected loss path, who absorbs it, compensation, and the impact path through the smart contracts;

unverified

For Franklin Templeton’s BENJI tokenized U.S. money market fund on Ethereum, the top counterparty stress logically maps to the largest underlying money-market exposure (e.g., a major bank or repo counterparty), not an on-chain borrower. On‑chain positions and exact counterparties are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03. ### 1. Expected loss path (off‑chain fund level)

  • BENJI represents shares of a registered U.S. money market fund, holding short‑term debt and repo-style instruments of multiple counterparties.
  • If the largest counterparty defaults (e.g., unsecured CP issuer, repo counterparty, bank deposit exposure), the fund suffers a mark‑to‑market loss on those positions and potential recovery over time via bankruptcy proceedings.
  • Loss absorption follows regulated MMF rules: interest income and NAV absorb impairments; if large enough, the fund may need to break the buck, restrict redemptions, or be supported by the sponsor (Franklin Templeton), subject to SEC rules. ### 2. Who absorbs the loss
  • Economic loss is borne by BENJI fund shareholders (off‑chain register), i.e., the beneficial owners of the tokenized shares.
  • The issuer / sponsor may choose to inject capital or buy impaired assets to stabilize NAV, but this is discretionary and subject to regulation; it’s not coded in smart contracts.
  • Smart contracts themselves do not bear credit risk; they only record token balances and handle transfer/subscribe/redeem flows. ### 3. Compensation / protection
  • Protection mechanisms are those of a regulated MMF: diversification limits, credit quality rules, WAM/WAL limits, liquidity buffers; there is no protocol-native insurance pool on-chain.
  • Any sponsor support (capital injection, fee waiver) is an off‑chain corporate action affecting NAV and is reflected in the off‑chain holdings and then in token pricing. ### 4. Impact path through smart contracts
  • If the fund imposes redemption gates, liquidity fees, or suspends redemptions due to stress, the on‑chain BENJI contracts would enforce these via:
  • Blocking or queueing on‑chain redemption functions.
  • Applying adjusted prices/fees received from the off‑chain fund admin.
  • Token balances remain; their economic value changes as the fund’s NAV changes off-chain, then feeds into pricing of mint/redeem operations.
  • There is no on‑chain rehypothecation or DeFi lending layer directly tied to BENJI in core documentation; secondary DeFi integrations (if any) would transmit stress via collateral devaluation and liquidation cascades, but these are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03.
Evidence (2)

stress scenario - committed fraud by the DAO or owners

two sources

For the stress scenario “committed fraud by the DAO or owners,” I found no evidence of a DAO governing BENJI, so that specific DAO-fraud pathway is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03. BENJI is described by Franklin Templeton as a tokenized fund / blockchain platform with KYC/AML controls and centralized operational features, which is structurally inconsistent with DAO-style governance. On the owner/founder fraud side, I found no sourced allegation or confirmed incident that Franklin Templeton’s owners committed fraud in connection with BENJI.

The available sources instead describe general digital-asset, regulatory, and operational risks, including fraud/scam awareness notices and third-party security reviews identifying contract-level control and access issues—not fraud by the owners. The most relevant stress takeaway is centralization risk, not proven fraud: Trail of Bits reported owner/treasury-control behaviors in BenjiSwap and contract designs that allow privileged actions, while Franklin Templeton documents that shares can be frozen or restricted under compliance or regulatory circumstances. That means a severe stress case could involve owner misuse, regulatory intervention, or privileged control abuse, but actual committed fraud by the DAO or owners is not verified from the provided evidence.

So the answer is: no verified fraud event; DAO-fraud is not applicable/Not verifiable, and owner-fraud is not substantiated by the sources reviewed.

Evidence (6)

stress scenario - primary yield source negative 30d,

two sources

BENJI’s primary yield source is the underlying Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund, whose yield is tied to short-term U.S. government money market instruments and cash/repo holdings; Franklin Templeton states BENJI “accrues yield daily” and that the fund’s 7-day effective yield was 3.62% as of 08/06/2026. On a 30-day basis, RWA.xyz shows BENJI’s 30D APY at 3.56% and no negative 30D yield signal in the provided sources.

For a stress scenario with primary yield source negative 30d, the supported conclusion is that this condition is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-03 from the available sources because none of the provided results show a negative 30-day yield for BENJI or an on-chain confirmation of a yield breakdown under stress. What can be said with confidence is that BENJI’s yield is structurally exposed to short-end U.S. rates: Franklin Templeton says the fund’s yield reflects money market performance, and its documents note efforts to prevent negative yield through waivers/fee support if needed. That means a sustained negative 30-day primary yield would likely imply either an extreme market-rate dislocation, unusual fund expenses, or fee/waiver mechanics offsetting investor returns, but that inference is not directly verified in the provided sources.

Evidence (4)

Governance & Legal

governance

one source

Assessment as of September 13, 2026: BENJI is not a DAO or community-governed DeFi protocol. It represents shares of Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), a registered investment company.

Governance is exercised through Franklin Templeton Trust’s board of trustees, Franklin Advisers, Inc. as investment manager, and Franklin Templeton Investor Services, LLC as transfer agent—not token-holder voting. The board oversees the Trust and officers administer day-to-day operations. Control surface: The Ethereum deployment is permissioned and exposes Registry, Authorization, Transactional, Transfer Agent, Intent Validation, and MultiSig modules; the listed Ethereum fund-token address is 0x3DDc84940Ab509C11B20B76B466933f40b750dc9, with MultiSig module 0xA2Bd91Fb0c8258134706629edf7464C14bAB8b66. The prospectus states that the transfer agent has unilateral control over blockchain share records, can correct erroneous/unauthorized transactions, restrict transfers, approve wallets and networks, and migrate records after a network failure.

This is substantive company/transfer-agent control, not symbolic decentralization. Proposal process: No DAO proposal or token-voting process identified. Changes follow the fund’s board, investment-manager, transfer-agent, SEC filing, and shareholder-notice framework. A governance-controlled upgrade path is not evidenced. Company-controlled entity: Franklin Templeton Trust is the registrant; SEC file no.

811-23471, CIK 1786958. Franklin Advisers, Inc. is identified as investment manager; Investor Services is transfer agent. Trust jurisdiction, state registration number, complete current trustee/director roster beyond the cited filing, and Benji application Terms of Service: Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026. On-chain voting/holders: Dune MCP is unavailable in this run; voting concentration, top holders, holder percentages, signer identities, and multisig threshold are Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026.

No on-chain claim is inferred. Risk conclusion: Centralized permissioned fund-token infrastructure. Transfer-agent powers can alter tokenized share ownership without DAO approval; therefore administrative fund/share control is material. No timelock was evidenced.

Fields: timelock=null; timelock_delay_hours=null; multisig_threshold=null; multisig_owners=null; admin_can_drain=true; emergency_bypass=true; dao_governance=false.

Admin can drain
Yes
Emergency bypass
Yes
Dao governance
No
Evidence (2)

legal & regulatory

one source

Franklin Templeton’s Benji offering is a tokenized U.S. government money market fund (Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund, ticker BENJI) issued by a large, regulated asset manager, not a permissionless DeFi protocol. Entity & jurisdiction

  • Entity: Franklin Templeton’s fund complex, specifically the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund, a registered investment company under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940.
  • Jurisdiction: Primarily United States; the fund is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and subject to U.S. federal securities laws. Legal structure vs. actual risk
  • Legal structure: a regulated money market mutual fund that invests in U.S. government securities and repurchase agreements, with tokenized shares recorded on a public blockchain (Ethereum) via the BENJI token.
  • Actual risk: investors face traditional money market fund risks (interest rate, credit/counterparty, liquidity) plus smart contract / operational / custody risks from tokenization and blockchain settlement. On‑chain exposures and smart‑contract security are not independently verifiable here ("Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑03"). Classification & investor eligibility
  • Classified as a U.S. government money market fund; shares are securities, not crypto commodities.
  • Distribution is limited to eligible investors per Franklin Templeton’s prospectus and local securities laws; likely restricted by residency, accreditation and KYC/AML status (details in fund documents). ToS / KYC / AML / data protection
  • Access to BENJI generally requires onboarding through Franklin Templeton or intermediaries, under full KYC/AML processes consistent with U.S. requirements (e.g., Bank Secrecy Act, PATRIOT Act).
  • Data protection is governed by Franklin Templeton’s privacy policies and applicable laws (e.g., U.S. privacy rules; possible GDPR compliance for EU clients).
  • BENJI tokens are not freely transferrable like typical DeFi assets; transfers can be constrained by transfer‑agent controls and compliance checks. Regulatory actions, court cases, sanctions
  • As of this check, no specific active enforcement action or sanctions targeting the BENJI fund or Franklin Templeton in relation to Benji’s tokenization have been identified ("Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑03").
  • Franklin Templeton, as a major asset manager, has a long regulatory history, but nothing surfaced that directly alleges misconduct tied to BENJI itself within the last 7 days. Warnings / restrictions for institutional DeFi users
  • BENJI is not a permissionless DeFi protocol; it is a regulated security product whose on‑chain representation sits inside traditional fund, transfer‑agent, and compliance rails.
  • Institutional users must treat BENJI exposure as securities exposure, with all associated regulatory obligations (securities licensing, fund suitability, reporting), not as pure crypto yield.
Entity
Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (BENJI) / Franklin Templeton
Jurisdiction
United States
Evidence (2)

legal registries

two sources

Legal entity per GLEIF: Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (LEI 549300RHMKYGLHGI7667; jurisdiction US; registration ACTIVE). OFAC SDN screening of 'Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund', 'Franklin Templeton', 'Franklin Templeton BENJI': no match. SEC litigation and administrative release feeds: no mention.

Screened names
  • Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund
  • Franklin Templeton
  • Franklin Templeton BENJI
Entity
Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund
LEI
549300RHMKYGLHGI7667
Jurisdiction
US
Entity status
ACTIVE
Sanctioned
No
Evidence (4)

Stability

stability

two sources

Franklin Templeton BENJI is not Franklin Templeton’s own stablecoin; it is the on-chain share token for the Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX), which targets a stable $1.00 NAV. Public web sources reviewed do not show any verified historical depeg event for BENJI, so the count, last depeg date, and max depeg percentage are not verifiable as of 2026-09-05.

Own stablecoin
No
Stable
Yes
Evidence (3)

Risks & Strengths

risks

unverified

BENJI combines a regulated government money-market fund with permissioned blockchain recordkeeping on Ethereum. The dominant risks are therefore operational and legal—not typical permissionless-DeFi liquidity or oracle risks—with no Dune/on-chain verification available in this run: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026.

RiskImpactSeverityProbabilityMitigation in placeResidual risk
Permissioned control failureThe transfer agent has unilateral control over whitelisting, corrections, unauthorized transactions and transfer limits. A compromised administrator, flawed upgrade or operational error could freeze or misallocate tokenized shares.HighMediumPermissioned wallets, transfer-agent oversight, KYC/AML procedures and administrative controls are in place.High centralization and counterparty dependence remain; independent smart-contract audit status is Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026.
Ethereum network disruptionCongestion, outages, forks, fee spikes or changes to Ethereum could delay transfers, impair access or make the chain uneconomic. Franklin lists a $5 million minimum for Ethereum accounts because of transaction costs.HighMediumNetwork suitability standards monitor uptime, redundancy, block time and fees; migration is permitted if standards fail.Medium; migration may itself create downtime, reconciliation and operational risk.
Limited secondary liquidityBENJI shares are not listed on a public trading venue; peer-to-peer transfers require whitelisted counterparties and need not occur at NAV. Exit may therefore depend on Franklin redemption processing during business hours.HighMediumDirect redemption through the App or Institutional Web Portal; approved-wallet transfer functionality.Medium-High, especially during stress or when counterparties are unavailable.
Regulatory and compliance changeChanging securities, fund, AML/KYC, tax or blockchain rules could restrict issuance, redemption, transferability, platform access or Ethereum fee operations.HighMediumRegistered-fund structure, KYC/AML controls, whitelisting and ongoing legal/regulatory compliance processes.Medium-High because regulatory interpretations can change rapidly.
NAV and principal lossThe fund seeks, but cannot guarantee, a $1.00 NAV. Agency securities may lack full U.S. government backing; interest-rate, credit, liquidity and large-redemption stress can cause losses or impair stability.MediumLowAt least 99.5% in government securities, cash or fully collateralized repos; short maturity limits and amortized-cost procedures.Medium; BENJI is not a bank deposit or FDIC-insured product.
Evidence (2)

strengths

two sources

Franklin Templeton BENJI’s top strengths are: first, it combines a regulated U.S. money market fund structure with onchain share ownership and settlement, giving investors both regulatory familiarity and blockchain-native transferability. Second, it offers peer-to-peer transferability and near-instant settlement, which is a major operational advantage over traditional fund rails. Third, BENJI provides daily and intraday yield accrual/distribution, including second-by-second accrual on transfers, making the product more capital-efficient for holders.

Fourth, it has multi-chain availability, which broadens access and lets users choose different networks for cost, speed, and ecosystem reach. Fifth, Franklin Templeton emphasizes institutional-grade credibility and compliance, including a long operating history, public-chain recordkeeping, and third-party smart contract audits.

Evidence (8)

Methodology & Limitations

  • On-chain metrics: not verifiable — Dune phase 2 is not enabled.
  • 0 of 25 fact categories not yet collected.
  • Fact verifiability: 18 two independent sources, 10 one source, 6 unverified.
  • Oldest fact verification date: 2026-08-30.