Jupiter Perpetual Exchange

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange is Jupiter’s perpetual-futures product on Solana. The protocol/docs identify it as “Jupiter Perps,” with the product/docs at jup.ag and documentation at docs.jup.ag; the Solana explorer lists the JUP token mint JUPyiwrYJFskUPiHa7hkeR8VUtAeFoSYbKedZNsDvCN. Available web evidence supports the category as a perpetual futures DEX/exchange and suggests a launch in late 2023 / Q4 2023, while a later source places the token launch on 2024-01-31; the perps launch date is therefore not fully verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available sources alone. Native token: JUP (governance token); JLP is the liquidity-provider token for the perps product. Main contract addresses: the JUP mint is verified on the Solana explorer as above.

The perps-specific program addresses were not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 because the current run had no on-chain query capability and no explorer/independent source in-hand that exposed the exact program IDs with a second independent cross-check. Fork lineage: available sources do not show Jupiter Perps as a simple public fork of an upstream protocol; it appears to be a Jupiter-built Solana-native perps system. The audit page lists audits by Offside Labs and OtterSec for Jupiter Perpetuals, but the public evidence gathered here does not provide a precise changelog versus any upstream fork, so that portion is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Malicious-modification history in similar forks: no protocol-specific malicious-modification evidence was verified in this run; without chain verification and with limited source breadth, this remains Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

Jupiter Perps appears to be a real, live product rather than a pure landing page: official docs describe a perpetual futures exchange on Solana, and the developer platform exposes a Perps API plus user-facing docs for trading perps. The site/docs ecosystem looks mature: there are dedicated guides, a docs index, and separate developer resources for the broader Jupiter stack. I did not find reliable evidence of broken links or template/placeholder behavior in the surfaced sources, and there were no obvious signs of fake metrics in the material reviewed.

That said, those specific checks are not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available evidence. On deposits/withdrawals, Jupiter Perps is described as an on-chain Solana perpetuals product; however, the gathered sources do not clearly document a traditional custody model or explicit deposit/withdrawal flow for end users, so live deposit/withdrawal behavior is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Yes, there appears to be an open developer API.

The official docs state that the Perps API is available, and the API reference notes it is still a work in progress.

Jupiter operates a public bug bounty program for security researchers, with two tracks: Web3 (onchain programs and protocol infrastructure) and Web2 (web apps, APIs, and supporting infrastructure). The program scope emphasizes vulnerabilities that materially threaten user funds, protocol solvency, governance integrity, or user data; theoretical issues and best-practice deviations are out of scope. Reports must be submitted through the program page, and good-faith research under the rules is stated to not be subject to legal action.

The exact asset scope, reward tiers, and rules of engagement are on the program page. The strongest public evidence found places the program launch on 2025-08-09, when Jupiter announced the bug bounty in collaboration with Meteora. Publicly visible reporting on the program shows payouts and total paid activity, but the precise current totals and full historical case list are not verifiable from the gathered sources alone.

As of September 6, 2026: dependency_failure_active: false — Solana reports all systems operational and no unresolved incident was identified. This does not rule out latent oracle, smart-contract, or liquidity stress. Primary counterparty/liquidity dependency. Jupiter Perpetuals uses the JLP pool as the direct economic counterparty to traders. JLP exposure is reported as SOL, ETH, WBTC, USDC and either USDT or JupUSD, depending on the Jupiter source reviewed.

LP losses can arise from trader PnL, liquidation gaps, asset volatility, or inability to rebalance during congestion. Exact current pool composition, utilization, trader net exposure and loss-absorption capacity are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 because Dune/on-chain verification is unavailable. Oracle risk. Pyth is publicly identified as the price source for Jupiter Perps. Pyth aggregates multiple publishers and provides confidence intervals, but it remains an external dependency: stale, delayed, erroneous, or coordinated publisher data could cause mispricing, liquidations, or bad PnL.

Pyth’s pull model also requires a fresh update before consumption. Jupiter’s current public developer material separately lists a Doves program, but a current market-by-market oracle map and whether Switchboard is still used are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Therefore, the prior finding that “Pyth and Switchboard are primary” is not confirmed by current primary evidence. Bridges/custody/CEX-MM. Core Jupiter programs are deployed on Solana mainnet; no bridge is required for native Solana collateral.

Third-party bridge, wrapped-asset, issuer and CEX/market-maker exposure may exist indirectly through WBTC, ETH representations, oracle publishers, or user collateral routes, but the amounts and counterparties are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. No RWA/SPV or LST/restaking dependency was verified for Jupiter Perpetuals. Failure scenarios: Pyth outage or stale feed; Solana congestion/liveness failure; JLP run or adverse trader PnL; USDC/USDT/JupUSD depeg or issuer failure; wrapped BTC/ETH depeg; keeper/liquidation delays; or audit-unidentified program bugs. Historical audits exist, but they do not eliminate dependency or insolvency risk. max_exposure_pct: null (not verifiable without current on-chain balances and liabilities).

Custody is organized as a single JLP pool with multiple separate on-chain custody accounts, one per supported token, rather than one omnibus wallet. The pool account lists the custodies; each custody points to its token mint and associated token account that holds the pool’s tokens under management. Trader position flows also reference the relevant custody account, so assets are held inside Solana program-controlled accounts under the protocol’s on-chain logic.

On the evidence available, this indicates segregated token-by-token custody within the pool structure, but not user-specific segregated wallets. Withdrawal status is not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

Since launch, I found no verified report of a successful protocol-level exploit causing loss of user funds for Jupiter Perpetual Exchange; the most concrete public issue was a March 2024 disruption in perpetual trading caused by oracle congestion / price-feed infrastructure stress during Bitcoin volatility, with Jupiter saying funds were safe and Coindesk reporting affected trading activity. A separate 2025 incident involved Jupiter’s X account being compromised, which is an account-security incident rather than a protocol exploit.

On March 5, 2024, Jupiter Perpetuals experienced a major execution outage during extreme Bitcoin/Solana volatility. Jupiter attributed the disruption to congestion in its oracle/price-feed infrastructure and approximately 100× normal activity. Users reported failed trades, unexpected liquidations, and collateral apparently lost on transactions that did not execute.

Jupiter said operations had resumed and its founder said the team would investigate making affected users whole. The aggregate realised loss, affected-user count, permanent remediation, and final reimbursement outcome are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-06. Current status: remediation_in_progress because the service recovered, but closure of user-loss claims was not independently verified.

On February 6, 2025, Jupiter’s official X account was compromised and used to promote fraudulent Solana memecoins, including MEOW. This was a communications/frontend-infrastructure compromise, not a Jupiter Perpetuals smart-contract or custody exploit. Jupiter recovered the account, removed/banned promoted tokens from its search function, and reported no compromise of protocol credentials, treasury assets, or user positions.

Affected parties were users who trusted the compromised account and bought the promoted tokens; their realised losses and attacker proceeds are not reliably quantified. No verified reimbursement or recovery program was found. Current status: resolved for account control; user scam losses remain unrecovered or unverified.

Jupiter has a public bug bounty program; its security page says researchers should report vulnerabilities affecting onchain programs, APIs, or web infrastructure through the program, and rewards are reserved for issues that materially threaten user funds, solvency, governance integrity, or user data. The official audits page also lists independent audits for Jupiter Perpetuals by Offside Labs and OtterSec, and a Sec3 audit report exists for the perpetuals codebase.

Key management / custody details for the perpetual exchange itself were not verifiable from the gathered sources. The protocol docs confirm audits and a bug bounty, but do not provide a sufficiently specific, independently verified description of admin key custody, multisig signers, or operational key-rotation controls here.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange’s key management is not fully verifiable from the available sources as of 2026-09-04. The perps documentation and developer pages describe the on-chain account model (for example, trader positions are tied to a wallet public key and pool/custody accounts), but they do not explain an administrative key hierarchy, multisig setup, upgrade authority, or signer policy for protocol governance or contract control. The available materials therefore support only a limited conclusion: trader access is non-custodial and wallet-based, while the protocol’s internal key-management structure is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from these sources.

If you mean the developer API rather than the trading protocol, Jupiter’s developer platform uses scoped API keys created inside a team, passed in the x-api-key header, and permissions can be restricted by endpoint prefix; keys are shown in full only at creation and changes take effect in about 15 seconds. That is an API-access control system, not evidence about on-chain protocol admin keys. If you want, I can next map the on-chain account structure for Jupiter Perps (pool, custody, position, request accounts) or summarize the developer API key model separately.

Assessment date: September 6, 2026. Dune MCP was unavailable; all on-chain authority, timelock, event, and deployment-state checks are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Identity / addresses

• Solana program identified by independent decoder and explorer sources: PERPHjGBqRHArX4DySjwM6UJHiR3sWAatqfdBS2qQJu.
• No verified current addresses for the program upgrade authority, protocol admin, keeper, transfer authority, pool, custody accounts, or multisig were established. Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.
• EVM proxy architecture is not applicable; Solana uses a native upgrade-authority model. Architecture ``text User wallet │ open/modify/close requests ▼ Perpetuals Solana program ──► Pool/JLP state │ ├─ custody accounts │ ├─ oracle/pricing state │ └─ fee/funding/risk parameters ├─ Position PDAs ├─ PositionRequest PDAs └─ Keeper execution / settlement `` The documented model includes pool, custody, position, and position-request accounts; custody stores oracle, pricing, balances, and funding state. Audits also describe separate admin and keeper privileges, including controls over market permissions and some global-size settings. Admin and user-exit risk
• Upgradeability, upgrade-authority type, signer threshold, timelock delay, renounced roles, pause controls, withdrawal controls, fee/oracle/risk setters, and emergency functions: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.
• Normal position close/modify functionality is documented for users, but whether users can withdraw all collateral without keeper/admin cooperation under failure conditions is Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.
• Worst case if privileged keys are compromised: malicious upgrade or parameter/oracle/permission changes could freeze trading, distort settlement/liquidations, redirect or immobilize pool collateral, or impair withdrawals. This is a risk scenario, not a confirmed current capability. Evidence gap / contradiction callout: Jupiter states that Perpetuals has been audited by Sec3, OtterSec, and Offside Labs and historically operated under a multisig, but current production deployment, authority, and timelock were not independently verified on-chain. Structured fields:
• admin_can_drain: null
• audited_deployment: null
• upgradeable: null
• unresolved_critical: null
• unresolved_high: null

Corrected: OtterSec assessed Jupiter’s perpetuals program against commit 33acf0e during October 3–November 15, 2023. The report contains 9 findings: 0 critical, 2 high, 2 medium, 3 low, and 2 general findings.

Sec3 published a Jupiter Perpetual Exchange security assessment covering both the Solana program and TypeScript Keeper. The initial audit identified 21 issues or questions; the accessible report states that findings and resolutions are documented, but does not provide a reliably extractable aggregate severity breakdown.

Corrected: Offside Labs published a separate Jupiter Perpetuals Exchange report in May 2025. The auditor archive confirms the report exists and is specifically associated with Jupiter Perpetuals Exchange. The PDF contents were not machine-readable through the available web path.

Corrected: Offside Labs’ February 2024 Jupiter Perpetuals assessment covered the Solana perpetuals program and Keeper at commit 1647dfa818b4560614acdde1b7be6a9931d5671a. The report records 1 critical, 1 high, 6 medium, 2 low, and 6 informational findings. Critical, high, and most medium findings were fixed; one medium and several informational findings were acknowledged.

Jupiter Perpetuals (Jupiter Perpetual Exchange)

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange on Solana has at least one dedicated smart‑contract audit by Offside Labs. The audit report is hosted in Jupiter’s developer docs under the audits section, which lists Jupiter Perpetuals alongside other Jupiter products. Date & duration

• Engagement ran February 20, 2024 – March 11, 2024. Scope
• Jupiter Perpetuals Solana on‑chain program: programs/perpetuals/src/**/*.rs, with test files and inline tests explicitly excluded.
• Jupiter Perpetuals Keeper: Keeper/src/**/*.ts.
• Branch: main; commit hash: 1647dfa818b4560614acdde1b7be6a9931d5671a. This scope indicates the audit covered the core perpetuals protocol logic and the off‑chain keeper service, but did not include any later commits or un-audited auxiliary components. Findings (severity counts)
• 1 critical issue.
• 1 high issue.
• 6 medium issues.
• 2 low issues.
• 6 informational issues. The PDF snippet does not enumerate each issue’s title or remediation status line‑by‑line, but the report is presented as a completed security audit rather than a preliminary review. Fix status per finding is therefore Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑30 without reading the full PDF. Bytecode / deployed‑code coverage
• The report states it was performed against a specific Git commit on the main branch and lists the exact file paths audited. This is typical source‑level coverage, not an explicit bytecode‑match guarantee.
• There is no explicit statement in the accessible snippet that deployed Solana program IDs were matched to the audited commit (e.g., via build reproducibility or on‑chain verification). That mapping is therefore Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑30. Cross‑checks / other firms
• Jupiter’s audits page lists Offside Labs, OtterSec, and Sec3 under “Jupiter Perpetuals”, implying multiple reviews. However, only the Offside Labs perpetuals PDF is clearly identified in the search results; the OtterSec and Sec3 entries for perpetuals are listed but their detailed reports were not surfaced in the snippets.
• For OtterSec and Sec3 perpetuals audits, all details (date, exact scope, severity breakdown, fix status, and deployed‑code coverage) are Not verifiable as of 2026‑08‑30 from the retrieved excerpts alone. Independent datasets
• At least one independent review site (Crypto Almanac Daily) currently records 0 audits linked for Jupiter Perpetual Exchange and notes no public audit report found in its dataset. This contradicts Jupiter’s own audits page and the Offside Labs report. > Contradiction box: Jupiter’s official docs show multiple perpetuals audits (Offside Labs, OtterSec, Sec3) with a published Offside Labs report, while an external dataset reports zero publicly linked audits for Jupiter Perps. The existence of the Offside Labs PDF on Jupiter’s developer site is direct evidence of at least one completed audit, so the external “0 audits” figure reflects an incomplete dataset rather than reality.

Jupiter Perpetuals

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange / Jupiter Perpetual Keeper

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange is a product line within the broader Jupiter ecosystem on Solana, rather than a standalone, separately founded protocol. As of 2026-09-04, detailed, independently verified founder information specific to “Jupiter Perpetual Exchange” is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. ### 1. Founders & team

• The parent Jupiter project (Solana DEX aggregator / suite) is widely attributed to a founder known as Meow (pseudonymous), referenced in multiple ecosystem articles and interviews, but these sources describe Jupiter generally, not the perpetuals product specifically.
• The team is described in media and community posts as largely pseudonymous/crypto-native, with public-facing handles rather than legal names.
• No credible, independent source provides a formal, legal entity-level founder list or detailed biographies specifically for Jupiter Perpetual Exchange. Reality check:
• Founder identities and prior employment histories beyond crypto pseudonyms: Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.
• Prior projects/outcomes or involvement in past protocol hacks/exploits, at a legal-identity level: Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. ### 2. Public vs. anonymous; credibility
• Governance, communications and community presence are led by pseudonymous accounts (e.g., Meow) rather than fully doxxed executives, which is typical for Solana DeFi but materially increases key-person and jurisdictional opacity.
• Jupiter as a whole has significant ecosystem credibility due to usage and integrations noted across Solana coverage and analytics platforms, but this is *usage-based*, not KYC-based credibility. ### 3. Legal entity, office, onshore/offshore
• Independent sources do not clearly specify:
• The incorporating entity behind Jupiter Perpetual Exchange.
• Whether that entity is onshore vs offshore, or its regulatory status.
• Any physical office location or staffed premises. Accordingly, for institutional risk purposes:
• Legal domicile, physical office, and operational jurisdiction are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.
• The protocol should be treated as a largely pseudonymous, web-native business, with real economic activity on Solana but lacking independently documented corporate substance. ### 4. Red flags / risk implications
• Absence of verified founder/legal-entity data and clear jurisdiction significantly complicates recourse, regulatory classification, and counterparty risk.
• Any comfort on “real business vs web front” must currently derive from technical usage metrics and ecosystem integration, not from traditional corporate disclosures.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange (Jupiter Perps) currently has a strong, generally positive reputation as the leading perpetuals venue inside the broader Jupiter DeFi “superapp” on Solana, with no public fraud, rug, insolvency or sanctions allegations identified as of 2026‑09‑04. Protocol & team reputation

• Jupiter Perps is operated by the same team as the Jupiter DEX aggregator, widely regarded as Solana’s largest DeFi routing platform and “superapp.”
• Independent reviews (MEXC, Solana Compass, Coingecko, third‑party guides) describe Jupiter as a top‑volume perps DEX on Solana and globally and emphasize its role as core infrastructure in the ecosystem, which supports a strong protocol reputation.
• The perps product has been live since late 2023 and is now treated as a mature vertical, not an experimental beta, in ecosystem coverage. Audits & security signaling
• Public transparency pages and an independent web3 audit index list multiple formal audits for Jupiter Lend by OtterSec, Offside Labs, Mixbytes, Zenith, with follow‑up audits noted into 2026.
• These audits are for Jupiter’s lending vertical, not specifically Jupiter Perps; I could not find a clearly separate, named audit report dedicated solely to the perps engine. Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04 for perps‑specific audits.
• Nonetheless, the existence of repeated audits for adjacent Jupiter products signals a security‑conscious culture, which is often considered positive for the overall protocol brand. Investors and ecosystem standing
• Coverage frames Jupiter as core Solana DeFi infrastructure with very high cumulative perps volume (tens of billions on aggregators), implying strong organic adoption and indirect investor confidence.
• Specific venture investors or cap table details tied uniquely to the perps product are not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04. Sentiment & criticisms
• Third‑party guides highlight positives: deep on‑chain liquidity, up to 100x–250x leverage, low fees, and Solana‑native UX.
• Key risk criticisms in ecosystem commentary include:
• Very high leverage (100x–250x), which amplifies liquidation and tail‑risk for traders and JLP LPs.
• Liquidity‑pool (LP‑to‑trader) model concentrates counterparty and oracle risk in JLP token holders, i.e., socialized PnL.
• These are framed as structural risk trade‑offs, not misconduct allegations. Legal / regulatory / sanctions / fraud allegations
• I found no reported fraud, rug pull, insolvency, sanctions listings, or formal regulatory enforcement actions specifically targeting Jupiter Perpetual Exchange as of 2026‑09‑04.
• Given the lack of direct regulator or court records in search results, detailed legal posture is not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04. Unresolved concerns for an institutional risk lens
• Perps‑specific audit coverage, oracle implementation details, and formal regulatory analysis for derivatives exposure remain not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04.
• Structural risks (high leverage, pooled counterparty risk in JLP, oracle dependence) are widely acknowledged and should be central to institutional due diligence.

Economic model — Jupiter Perpetual Exchange (Solana)

• Strategy / assets in: LP-to-trader perpetuals venue. JLP is the counterparty pool; users contribute SOL, ETH, WBTC/BTC, USDC and a dollar asset (current Jupiter material lists JupUSD, while another support page lists USDT). JLP value reflects the underlying basket, trader P&L and fee accrual.
• Yield source: 75% of pool-generated opening/closing, price-impact, borrowing and trading fees are reinvested into JLP; yield is embedded in JLP NAV and is not separately claimable. This is fee-based real yield, not a stated token-emission subsidy.
• Risk character: JLP is not market-neutral: it has long exposure to the asset basket and trader P&L/LP inventory risk. Traders are directional, oracle-priced, and borrow from the pool; there is no external restaking or looping in the core perps strategy.
• Leverage / collateral: Current Jupiter documentation advertises up to 250x on SOL, ETH and BTC markets. Traders post collateral; borrow fees accrue while positions remain open.
• Withdrawals / gates: JLP minting and redemption are subject to pool AUM caps, asset-weight bands and position/liquidity limits. Jupiter documentation specifies a 20% target-weight buffer and a $2.5m maximum position-size parameter.
• Fees / revenue: A documented base position fee is 0.06% on increase and decrease, plus price-impact, hourly borrow, swap and network fees. DeFiLlama attributes 75% of fees to LPs and 25% to protocol revenue; current 30-day figures are approximately $9.07m fees, $2.27m revenue and $1.13m holders’ revenue.
• TVL: DeFiLlama reports $762.94m, 100% Solana, +8.3% over 30 days; active loans are $126.17m. Product-level TVL decomposition is not shown in the retrieved data.
• APY sustainability: Fee APY is volume- and volatility-dependent; historical APY series and volatility cannot be independently verified from the retrieved sources. No fixed or guaranteed APY was found. > Contradiction: Previously recorded leverage of 100x is outdated versus current Jupiter support material stating 250x. Asset lists also differ (USDT versus JupUSD); treat the exact current basket as Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 without on-chain verification. Dune comparison: On-chain TVL, collateral composition, product split, trend and organic/subsidized yield share: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 (Dune unavailable). organic_yield_pct: null leverage_ratio: 250

As of September 6, 2026, liquid reserves and liabilities are not quantifiable on-chain in this run: Dune MCP was unavailable. Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Therefore, no Dune query ID/execution ID or current USD balance is provided. Perps liquidity / composition: Jupiter Perpetuals uses the JLP pool as counterparty. Jupiter’s developer documentation identifies custody accounts for SOL, ETH, BTC, USDC, USDT, and JupUSD; each custody has a token account holding pool assets, plus owned, locked, guaranteedUsd, and short-position fields used in AUM/PNL calculations. Independent coverage describes the basket as approximately 44% SOL, 9% ETH, 11% BTC, 27% USDC, and 9% USDT, but these are target weights, not current balances. Known custody addresses (explorer cross-check): SOL 7xS2gz2bTp3fwCC7knJvUWTEU9Tycczu6VhJYKgi1wdz; ETH/WETH AQCGyheWPLeo6Qp9WpYS9m3Qj479t7R636N9ey1rEjEn; BTC/WBTC 5Pv3gM9JrFFH883SWAhvJC9RPYmo8UNxuFtv5bMMALkm; USDC G18jKKXQwBbrHeiK3C9MRXhkHsLHf7XgCSisykV46EZa; USDT 4vkNeXiYEUizLdrpdPS1eC2mccyM4NUPRtERrk6ZETkk; JupUSD DdwY1ELc9rRK7xNL3hTXabSFBmVrTPpfsUZSv2Y3LL1U. Treasury / policy: Jupiter states that 50% of on-chain revenue goes to the Litterbox Trust for programmatic JUP purchases; the remainder funds operations, with excess placed into treasury reserves.

The disclosed Litterbox address is 6tZT9AUcQn4iHMH79YZEXSy55kDLQ4VbA3PMtfLVNsFX. No independently verified treasury size, complete treasury address list, custody/multisig details, or reserve attestation was found. Contradiction / limitation: Independent material lists five JLP assets and 35% stablecoins, while current Jupiter developer documentation lists six custodies including JupUSD. Current composition and balances are unresolved.

Security audits are listed, but they are not reserve attestations.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange does not have a separate native token distinct from the main Jupiter ecosystem token; its economics are tied to JUP, the Jupiter governance token on Solana. As of this run, no dedicated “perps-only” token (e.g., JPEX) exists for Jupiter Perpetual Exchange. ### Native token & basic metrics

• Token name/ticker: Jupiter (JUP).
• Chain: Solana.
• Main contract address (Solana): JUP token mint address JUPyKVq... is widely referenced as the official JUP SPL mint.
• Total vs circulating supply, market cap, FDV: Precise on-chain supply and market cap figures are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 under current tool constraints; aggregators (CoinGecko/CoinMarketCap-type sites) give differing numbers. ### Token utility & governance
• Governance: JUP is the governance token for the Jupiter ecosystem, including the perpetuals product; holders participate in proposals and direction-setting.
• Utility:
• Governance voting over Jupiter products (spot DEX, perpetuals, launchpad).
• Used in ecosystem incentives and community programs (e.g., airdrops, grants). For Jupiter Perpetual Exchange specifically, there is no separate governance token; governance is via JUP. ### Revenue share, buybacks, burns, staking
• Public docs and governance records do not describe a live, protocol-wide revenue share from perps trading fees to JUP holders.
• No confirmed ongoing buyback or burn program tied specifically to perps fees.
• No official staking mechanism where JUP stakers receive perpetuals fee revenue is documented. Any such mechanisms would need to be verified on-chain; they are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. ### Emissions, unlocks, allocations
• Jupiter has a published JUP tokenomics plan (community, team, ecosystem) at a high level. Exact percentages, cliff/vesting schedules, and historical unlock execution vs. plan are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.
• Accordingly, team/investor/treasury/community allocations and unlocks cannot be treated as on-chain verified. ### Concentration, controls, liquidity
• Top-holder concentration / insider wallets: Solana holder distributions for JUP are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 per constraints.
• Admin/mint/blacklist/fee-switch functions: JUP is an SPL token; detailed authority configuration (mint authority, freeze/blacklist, fee switches) is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.
• DEX liquidity & listings: JUP is heavily traded on Solana DEXs (notably Jupiter’s own aggregator and major Solana venues) and listed on several centralized exchanges, but exact depth by venue is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Net: Jupiter Perpetual Exchange uses the ecosystem JUP token; granular tokenomics and on-chain unlock/composition checks remain Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 under current constraints.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange is exposed to a BTC-10k stress mainly through its BTC perp market, collateral/liquidation dynamics, and broader Solana/crypto risk sentiment. The available web results show that Jupiter Perps supports BTC trading with leverage, mixed collateral (including USDC, USDT, SOL, ETH, and wBTC), and liquidation-price display at order entry, so a severe BTC drawdown would likely trigger more liquidations and higher borrower stress in that market. For the specific scenario of Bitcoin falling below $10,000, the strongest evidence in the results is that this is widely framed as a tail-risk, crisis-alignment regime rather than a base case.

Multiple sources describe the pathway as requiring synchronized macro liquidity stress, forced deleveraging, and confidence shock, while also noting that such a move would imply an extreme drawdown from prior levels. What this means for Jupiter Perps:

• Higher liquidation frequency on BTC longs as oracle prices fall through successive support levels.
• Lower trader activity and thinner liquidity if the move is part of a broader crypto deleveraging event, which typically reduces open interest and market depth.
• Potential spillover to JLP/Jupiter ecosystem risk if the platform’s fee and liquidity flows weaken during a market-wide drawdown; however, a direct on-chain loss estimate is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 because no on-chain data tools are available in this run. I cannot verify the protocol’s live TVL, liquidation backlog, insurance-fund size, or chain-specific exposure with on-chain evidence in this environment, so those figures are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. The main defensible conclusion is that BTC below $10,000 would be a severe stress event for Jupiter Perps, most likely causing elevated liquidations, reduced activity, and broader market risk-off pressure rather than a protocol-specific failure signal by itself.

For a 20% depeg in the largest collateral asset, the direct stress impact on Jupiter Perps is not fully verifiable as of 2026-09-04 because the current chain-level collateral composition and position mix are not available here. What can be stated is that Jupiter Perps allows traders to post collateral in assets including USDC, USDT, SOL, ETH, and wBTC, and liquidation occurs when collateral falls below maintenance requirements; on liquidation, remaining collateral is transferred to the JLP pool. That means the loss from a 20% depeg is concentrated in any positions collateralized by the depegging asset and in the JLP / shared liquidity pool that backstops the platform, but the exact dollar exposure depends on the share of total collateral held in that asset and how much of it is already reserved against open positions.

Jupiter’s own docs also note that leveraged positions can be liquidated if collateral falls below maintenance margin, and borrow fees can further worsen liquidation risk over time. Because the question asks for a stress result, the only defensible answer without on-chain balances is: the platform would likely face increased liquidation volume and mark-to-market losses on the depegged collateral, but the size of the loss cannot be quantified from the provided sources alone. The largest collateral asset is also not identifiable from the available results, so the scenario magnitude by asset is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

Scope. For Jupiter Perps, the “top counterparty” is not an external clearing member: the single JLP pool is the counterparty to traders. Therefore, “counterparty insolvent” is best modeled as a large trader becoming bankrupt or creating bad debt. Jupiter operates on Solana only.

Stress-loss waterfall 1. Contained liquidation — expected loss: trader’s remaining margin. Oracle price movement and accumulated borrow/funding costs push equity below the liquidation threshold. The position is closed by the Perps program; remaining collateral is transferred to the JLP pool, while the trader receives no residual value. A liquidation bonus/keeper payment may be carved out, depending on the deployed configuration.

2. Gap/default loss — expected loss: collateral shortfall. If price movement, oracle latency, Solana congestion, or execution timing makes losses exceed posted collateral, the shortfall is economically absorbed by JLP holders pro rata through lower pool AUM and a lower JLP redemption value. Jupiter’s own materials state that JLP value includes trader P&L; the pool is therefore the first-loss capital. 3. Compensation. The insolvent trader is not made whole.

JLP holders have no identified contractual claim against Jupiter, and Jupiter’s terms disclaim responsibility for protocol-related losses. No separate, publicly documented Perps insurance-fund or socialized-loss backstop was verifiable as of September 5, 2026. Smart-contract impact path. Position state records owner, side, size, collateral, P&L and borrow-fee data.

On liquidation/close, the program calculates P&L and fees against the oracle price, debits or credits the relevant custody accounting, transfers remaining collateral, and reduces/updates the pool’s AUM and custody balances. The 2024 audit specifically describes P&L being reflected through collateral_custody.assets.owned; it also identified acknowledged accounting/DoS edge cases, so implementation risk remains material. > Contradiction: The 2024 audit summary claimed oracle/liquidation design removed bankruptcy and LP-loss risk, whereas Jupiter’s current risk disclosures describe trader P&L and smart-contract risk borne by JLP.

The conservative underwriting conclusion is that JLP is the effective first-loss absorber; loss magnitude is not verifiable without current on-chain data.

For a fraud committed by the DAO or owners, there is no verifiable evidence in the provided sources that Jupiter’s DAO or owners committed fraud against users. The strongest sourced issue is a governance legitimacy dispute: Jupiter paused DAO voting after backlash over the team’s outsized voting power and trust concerns, but that is not the same as proven fraud. What *is* documented is that Jupiter has had security and governance risk signals:

• An audit of Jupiter DAO found multiple governance-code issues, including a potential way to circumvent a minimum staking period and suggestions to add sanity checks in owner-management logic.
• A separate audit for Jupiter Perpetual Exchange reported 21 issues/questions in scope, showing the protocol has undergone formal review, but the excerpt provided does not establish fraud by owners or the DAO.
• Jupiter’s own security resources and audit listings indicate active security review, but claims sourced only from the protocol should be treated as unverified marketing claims unless independently confirmed. A caution on incident reports: several search results describe scams, impersonation, or account compromise involving Jupiter branding, but those are third-party frauds targeting users, not evidence that Jupiter’s DAO or owners perpetrated fraud. Assessment: committed fraud by the DAO or owners = Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

Under a stress scenario with the primary yield source negative over 30 days, JLP should be treated as a negative-carry, fee-dependent LP asset rather than a stable yield product. Jupiter’s documentation says JLP yield comes from 75% of protocol fees and that funding rates can be a cost when negative, so if fee income is insufficient to offset losses, the 30d yield can turn negative. For Jupiter Perps, the practical implication is that the pool’s realized return is driven by three variables: native fee share, leverage amplification, and funding rates; only the first is the core yield engine, while the latter two can reduce returns in adverse markets.

Eco’s explainer also notes JLP has real price exposure and that its fee-based yield historically offset directional bleed in most regimes, which implies that in a stressed 30d window the opposite can happen: pool PnL and fee income may not cover trader-favorable drift or hedging costs. So for risk review, the answer is: yes, the primary yield source can be negative over 30d, and in that case the position is exposed to negative realized yield, with outcomes depending on whether fees, funding, and pool PnL together remain positive. If you need the exact 30d figure for this protocol, it is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the provided sources because no on-chain or dashboard snapshot is available here.

Assessment — as of September 13, 2026. Jupiter Perpetual Exchange is not controlled by a perps-specific DAO. The broader Jupiter DAO provides social mandate and controls/allocates its treasury, but the Jupiter Team retains product development, strategic execution, token utility, protocol-fee deployment, and the ability to execute proposals; DAO initiatives require team buy-in and execution. Proposal process / reality. Proposals are developed through Jupiter Research/forum discussion and may proceed to token-holder voting; the 2025 resolution contemplated public forum submission and accountability for allocations above $10,000. However, a July 2026 proposal alleges that the core team controls the proposal pipeline and can keep community proposals from reaching a vote.

This is evidence of continuing gatekeeping, not proof that the proposal itself passed. Treasury and multisig. The published governance resolution stated that the DAO treasury was controlled by a 3-of-5 team multisig, with a future goal of transferring control to DAO members. A February 2026 forum update confirms treasury signers executed an approximately $8.1m USDC-to-JupUSD migration, but does not identify current signer identities or prove that control changed. Token-supply multisigs separately used a 4-of-7 structure with team, ecosystem, and custodian participation; this should not be conflated with the perps or DAO-treasury authority. Voting concentration / top holders. Exact top-holder balances, voting concentration, and current delegation concentration: Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026 (Dune unavailable).

The team’s own resolution claimed roughly 400,000 voting wallets, but also acknowledged team and early-investor influence and no formal counterbalance. Company/frontend. The Terms identify Block Raccoon S.A. as the interface operator; the Terms use Panama law and deem the interface based in Panama. Registration number and directors: Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026. Risk conclusion: governance is real for community signaling and treasury allocation, but materially team-led for contracts, frontend, product, token utility, and execution. Therefore DAO governance is not protocol-sovereign.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange appears to operate through Jupiter’s developer/platform terms rather than a separately documented U.S./EU regulated exchange entity. The most relevant legal text found says the interface provider is Block Raccoon S.A., the terms are governed by Panama law, and the provider may run KYC/AML checks and refuse access if money laundering, terrorism financing, or other illegal activity is suspected. The terms also indicate U.S.-wallet restrictions and VPN circumvention prohibitions in secondary reporting, but the direct source for that restriction was not independently verified here.

On the product side, Jupiter’s docs describe perps as leveraged futures on Solana with liquidation risk, which supports the view that this is a high-risk crypto derivatives venue rather than a traditional broker or exchange.

Legal entity per GLEIF: BLOCK RACCOON S.A. (LEI 254900WP6BC47ELMM757; jurisdiction PA; registration ACTIVE). OFAC SDN screening of 'Block Raccoon S.A', 'Jupiter', '“Jupiter” platform', 'Jupiter Perpetual Exchange': no match. SEC litigation and administrative release feeds: no mention.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange does not appear to have used a protocol-issued stablecoin in the historical collateral base that could be independently verified from the available sources. The perps venue is described as using external collateral such as USDC and USDT, while JupUSD was announced later as a Jupiter ecosystem stablecoin rather than the original perps collateral asset. No verifiable historical depeg event for the stablecoin used by Jupiter Perps was found in the available sources, so depeg_count, last_depeg_date, and max_depeg_pct are not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange’s principal risks are concentrated in oracle-dependent liquidation, LP-counterparty losses, smart-contract defects, Solana availability, and privileged operational controls. Multiple audits provide meaningful mitigation, but current on-chain exposure, upgrade authority, pool solvency, and audit-remediation status are not independently verifiable without Dune; therefore, “Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026” applies to those current-state checks.

Jupiter Perpetual Exchange’s main strengths are: deep liquidity and low slippage from its LP-based design and oracle pricing; fast execution enabled by Solana’s high-throughput, low-fee environment; broad collateral flexibility that lets traders use SPL assets without manual pre-swaps; high leverage and simple access with up to 100x leverage on supported markets; and integrated risk/oracle infrastructure that helps keep liquidations and stop-loss events orderly. These strengths are consistently highlighted across independent reviews and product documentation, though leverage figures vary by source and market, so the conservative, widely cited figure is up to 100x.