JustLend V1

JustLend V1 is a Tron-native pooled lending (money market) protocol, the original SBM V1 shared-liquidity system of JustLend DAO built on a Compound V2-style architecture. Protocol identification

• Name: JustLend V1 (SBM V1 shared-liquidity money market).
• Category: DeFi lending/borrowing protocol (money market).
• Website / App: Main app at app.justlend.org, with a dedicated V1 front end at .../homeV1 (SBM V1).
• Docs: JustLend DAO documentation at docs.justlend.org, including protocol overview and risk section.
• Chains: Tron only for V1; TVL share is reported as 100% Tron.
• Native / governance token: JST (used for JustLend DAO governance).
• Launch date: DefiLlama lists JustLend from April 5, 2021; this is the earliest widely cited launch reference for the protocol. Precise on-chain deployment timestamps are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Main contract architecture (high level)
• Protocol uses jToken markets (e.g., jTRX, jUSDT, jUSDD, jWBTC) modeled on Compound V2: users supply TRX/TRC20 assets to receive interest-bearing jTokens; borrowers take loans against overcollateralized deposits.
• Governance is via GovernorBravo + Timelock contracts controlled by JST holders.
• Specific contract addresses and explorer verification statuses are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 (no direct on-chain tooling available this turn). Fork lineage and changes
• Docs explicitly state JustLend DAO is “built on the Compound V2 architecture”, indicating a Compound V2 fork adapted to Tron (TRX/TRC20, Stake 2.0, energy model).
• Changes vs upstream include:
• Support for Tron-native Stake 2.0 and sTRX liquid staking module.
• Integration of Energy Rental sub-protocol for Tron resource leasing.
• Tron-specific token standards and jToken implementations (TRC20). Audits and fork risk history
• A dedicated security assessment PDF (audit) exists, dated April 8, 2022, covering JustLend on Tron and reporting no critical findings.
• External risk trackers report 2 audits for JustLend DAO (including CertiK and SlowMist).
• Docs claim “multiple professional third-party audits”; this is a protocol self-claim labeled: unverified marketing claim beyond the named reports.
• No documented history of malicious-modification incidents in JustLend V1 forks was found; absence of evidence is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

JustLend V1 appears to be a real, functioning product portal rather than a dead landing page: the documentation points to an app at app.justlend.org and a live public API gateway at openapi.just.network, with read endpoints for market lists and user account data. The docs also describe write-capable flows for supply, withdraw, borrow, repay, collateral changes, rewards, and voting, which is consistent with an operational lending app rather than a brochure site. For maturity, the presence of a documented API reference, contract overview, and agent-acceptance run suggests a maintained production integration surface and not a template shell.

The docs additionally state that some legacy V1 markets are closed to new supply/borrow, which is a sign of lifecycle management rather than site abandonment. Open API: yes. The public REST API is explicitly documented, uses no authentication, and exposes endpoints such as /lend/jtoken and /lend/account.

What is not verifiable from the available web evidence alone is whether deposits/withdrawals are currently live in the exact browser UI at this moment, or whether there are broken links / fake metrics on the site, because that requires live page inspection and transaction-level confirmation. Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

JustLend DAO (JustLend V1 on Tron) has an active bug bounty program on Immunefi. The program went live on 31 August 2022, with a maximum bounty of $50,000. The reward structure shown on the program page is: Smart Contract Critical up to $50,000; Primacy of Rules High up to $20,000; Primacy of Rules Medium up to $10,000.

Rewards are paid by the JustLend DAO team in USDD on TRON, denominated in USD. The program page also states that critical smart-contract reports require a PoC and a suggested fix, while High and Medium smart-contract reports require a suggested fix. The disclosed program page shows no public payout history or disclosed incidents on the page itself, so results are not verifiable here.

The official JustLend docs also describe the bug bounty as ongoing.

Assessment: High counterparty/dependency risk; no active failure verified. JustLend V1 is single-chain on TRON, but its V1 market set includes TRX, USDT, USDD, USDJ/TUSD-like stablecoins, SUN/JST, sTRX, BTC/WBTC and ETH representations. Failures, freezes, depegs, or liquidity loss at token issuers, wrappers, or TRON liquidity venues could transmit losses through collateral valuation and liquidations. Exact asset balances, utilization, whale concentration, and exposure percentages are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 because Dune/on-chain verification is unavailable. Oracle/manipulation risk — material. Current documentation describes a Chainlink-backed feed relayed on-chain by a privileged poster; the oracle is denominated in TRX.

The independent audit identified privileged poster price-setting and anchorAdmin powers to alter anchors or pause/resume markets, and noted a 10% price-swing/capping mechanism. Compromise, censorship, stale feeds, or TRX/USD volatility could cause mispricing, bad debt, or unfair liquidations. > Contradiction / control gap: current documentation markets the oracle as Chainlink-backed, while the audit documents centralized relay and administrative privileges. Chainlink usage therefore does not eliminate operator/key-management risk. Stablecoin and issuer risk — high. USDT exposure depends on Tether and TRON-USDT transfer/liquidity functionality.

USDD adds TRON DAO Reserve dependence, including collateral management, PSM/issuer contracts, and depeg risk; USDD documentation identifies TRON DAO Reserve as issuer/custodian for USDDOLD. A USDD depeg could impair collateral value and liquidations simultaneously. Governance/custody/bridges/CEX-MM/RWA: V1 upgrades and parameter changes are governed through JST/WJST, GovernorBravo, and a 48-hour timelock; governance concentration remains a counterparty/control dependency. No separate custodian, CEX/MM, RWA issuer/SPV, or restaking dependency was independently verified. Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Failure scenarios: oracle compromise; USDD/USDT depeg; TRX crash causing correlated liquidations; wrapper/bridge insolvency or freeze for BTC/ETH assets; governance takeover or malicious parameter change; thin TRON liquidity causing liquidation shortfalls. Fields: dependency_failure_active: null; max_exposure_pct: null

JustLend V1 on Tron is organized as a non-custodial pooled-lending protocol: users supply TRX or TRC20 assets to smart contracts and receive jTokens as receipt tokens representing their claim on the pool, while the protocol contracts—not a centralized custodian—hold and account for the pooled liquidity. The model is shared-pool rather than segregated custody, with the Comptroller/risk layer enforcing collateral and liquidation rules across markets. I found no reliable evidence of a protocol-wide withdrawal pause for V1; market-specific suspensions have occurred for some assets, and those cases still allowed normal repayments and withdrawals in the affected market.

Segregated assets: false. Withdrawal paused: false.

A 2022 security assessment for JustLend reported at least one medium-severity issue, including 'GLOBAL-03: Missing input validation,' but the provided result does not show any exploitation or user loss.

April 2026 (settlement executed in March 2026): JustLend V1’s legacy USDCOLD market accumulated bad debt after the market sunset and its collateral factor was reduced to 0%. This was a market/credit-loss event, not a reported exploit. Affected parties were suppliers and borrowers in the USDCOLD market; JustLend identified 10 bad-debt accounts.

The protocol used reserve funds to repay 626,872.62 USDCOLD on behalf of those accounts. loss_usd: Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026 because the announcement reports token units, not a USD valuation, and on-chain verification was unavailable. attacker proceeds: none reported. Response/fix: the market was sunset, supply/borrow access was disabled, collateral factor set to 0%, and reserves were used for settlement. Reimbursement was completed in USDCOLD for the listed bad-debt accounts.

Current status: resolved. No separate JustLend V1 exploit or attacker-driven loss was identified after independent searches; on-chain confirmation is Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026.

Corrected/reconfirmed event. In March 2026, after the USDCOLD market was sunset and its collateral factor reduced to 0%, JustLend V1 accumulated bad debt from outstanding USDCOLD loans. This was a market/credit-loss event, not a reported exploit.

Affected parties were suppliers and borrowers in the legacy USDCOLD market. JustLend used reserve funds to repay 626,872.62 USDCOLD on behalf of bad-debt accounts. Response/fix: market sunset, collateral factor set to 0%, supply/borrow access disabled as part of the wind-down, and reserve-funded repayment executed. loss_usd: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026, because the official notice reports token units rather than a USD valuation and on-chain verification was unavailable. attacker proceeds: none reported. recovered_usd: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026, because repayment was denominated in USDCOLD.

Current status: resolved; the published repayment constitutes reimbursement for the identified bad-debt accounts, but no evidence was found of additional compensation beyond the stated repayment.

JustLend V1’s key management is organized as non-custodial user wallet signing plus protocol-level admin controls. End users interact through TronLink or another supported wallet, and the documentation for the MCP server says that in sign-only mode the browser/wallet signs transactions while private keys never leave the wallet. For protocol administration, JustLend describes governance through JST holders with proposals executed via GovernorBravo + Timelock, and the protocol’s audited security model says sensitive operations are protected by a timelock plus multi-signature setup, specifically to avoid a single point of key-management failure.

So, in practice, there are two layers:

• User keys: held by the user’s own wallet; JustLend does not custody them in the normal transaction flow.
• Admin keys / upgrade authority: controlled through governance and multi-signature procedures, with timelock delay before sensitive actions take effect. What is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available sources is the exact signer set, threshold, or operational key-rotation process for the current Tron deployment; the sources confirm the presence of multisig/timelock governance, but not the full live key-ops policy.

Assessment date: September 6, 2026 — TRON Mainnet. Dune MCP was unavailable; therefore current storage-slot values, decoded admin events, role holders, multisig configuration, and latest block-level state are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Addresses / architecture ``text JST TCFLL5…ZZy9 → WJST TXk9Ln…4ZD6 ↓ voting GovernorBravoDelegator TEqiF5…2uogD → Delegate implementation TCiQT…Qn5Dt → Timelock TRWNvb…Ew7x (documented delay: 172,800 sec / 48h) ↓ privileged execution Unitroller TGjYzg…WqFx7 → Comptroller implementation TETm1b…DgWs jToken Delegators (e.g., jTRX TE2Rzo…xRwP; jUSDT TXJgMd…ccvd) → per-market Delegate implementations PriceOracle TMiNC…YMQTV; per-market interest-rate models `` The documented design is Compound V2-style: Unitroller, GovernorBravo, and every CErc20Delegator are upgradeable; interest-rate models are non-proxy deployments replaced by parameter-change governance. Admin powers / failure modes

• Governance/Timelock can replace Comptroller and jToken implementations, alter risk parameters, market listings, reserve factors, pause controls, and potentially deploy malicious logic. The audit explicitly identifies arbitrary implementation replacement as a user-asset-loss risk.
• Price-oracle privileged roles can set prices, anchors, and pause/resume markets. This creates oracle-manipulation, liquidation, and freeze risk; the audit marked oracle centralization Acknowledged, not resolved.
• Users normally retain permissionless redeem/withdrawal paths, subject to liquidity, solvency, market pause, and oracle conditions. If governance keys or the Timelock authority are compromised, attackers could upgrade proxies, corrupt pricing, freeze exits, or cause loss through malicious accounting. Direct admin withdrawal/drain code is Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026; effective asset theft via hostile upgrades remains a material risk.
• The audit records Governor guardian renunciation, but current role state is Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. No current proof of multisig signers or enforced timelock delay beyond protocol documentation was independently obtained. Audit status: CertiK assessment delivered April 8, 2022: 0 critical; six major findings, including one acknowledged and one partially resolved. This is an audit of the reviewed codebase, not independently verified evidence that every current deployment matches it. Risk conclusion: upgradeability and oracle-admin concentration produce high governance/key-compromise risk; withdrawal freeze/rug risk is non-zero. Timelock reduces speed, not ultimate authority.

Security assessment for JustLend (TRON) covering the supply/borrow financial-model smart contracts. The report lists 16 total issues: 0 critical, 6 major/high, 1 medium, 2 minor, and 7 informational. The finding list includes centralization risks, oracle/feed issues, missing input validation, compiler-version declaration, public/external visibility issues, naming, boolean misuse, return-value handling, checks-effects-interactions violations, and a logic issue in exchangeRateStoredInternal().

The report states the audit was performed with static analysis and manual review, delivered 2022-04-08 UTC.

Published SlowMist security audit for the STRX / Staked TRX sub-protocol associated with JustLend DAO on TRON; this is not an audit of the core JustLend V1 lending markets. The report audits strx-protocol commit 38a60d393145a0202814eb870191db56637f6787. Audit period: April 24–May 5, 2023.

The report states the code had been deployed to mainnet at audit time; match to currently active contracts: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

Security audit of the STRX (Staked TRX) sub‑protocol associated with JustLend DAO on Tron, not the core JustLend V1 lending markets.

JustLend V1 appears to have a mixed and partly conflicting identity: the TRON lending protocol is publicly associated with Justin Sun as founder in third-party crypto directories and media, while separate UK startup listings for “JustLend” show Craig Smith as founder/CEO of a London-based lending company. For the TRON protocol specifically, the public-facing documentation and ecosystem references support that it is a real protocol product, but they do not provide a clearly documented, named founding team beyond the Justin Sun association. Reality check: the web presence suggests a real on-chain DeFi product backed by the JUST/TRON ecosystem, not just a marketing site, because it has public documentation, open-source contract/front-end repositories, and ecosystem coverage. However, the source set does not independently verify a real office, staffing, corporate domicile, or whether the operating entity is onshore/offshore; that is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

For credibility, Justin Sun is a high-profile founder with deep TRON ecosystem ties, which supports the protocol’s legitimacy at the ecosystem level, but the available results here do not establish the full personnel roster, prior project outcomes, or any specific hack history for JustLend V1 itself. The London JustLend startup materials, by contrast, indicate a separate real-world business identity with Craig Smith and a UK address, but those results are likely a namesake collision and should not be assumed to describe the TRON protocol without stronger address/contract matching. Bottom line: credible protocol, opaque team.

Public founder attribution is mainly to Justin Sun; detailed team composition, office structure, and legal jurisdiction remain Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

JustLend V1’s reputation is broadly *mixed-to-positive* in the DeFi analytics ecosystem, but with repeated concerns about centralization and TRON ecosystem dependence. Independent risk writeups characterize it as a large, active lending protocol with no major publicly documented exploit, while still flagging governance concentration and chain concentration as key risks. On audits/security, third-party sources say JustLend has been audited by firms including CertiK and SlowMist; DeFiSafety says it has undergone one CertiK audit, and another risk report lists two audits on record.

Exponential also says there have been no documented protocol hacks since launch. On founders/governance, risk commentary consistently points to Justin Sun / TRON-linked control and very limited published multisig transparency, which is a major reputational concern for a protocol at this scale. The most notable criticism is not insolvency or fraud allegations, but *custodial-style control risk*: users and analysts worry that governance power is too concentrated relative to TVL and protocol importance.

On sentiment, consumer-review sites show weak-to-mixed user sentiment: Trustpilot has only 19 reviews and Traders Union summarizes the profile as poor with a strongly negative review mix. These are low-confidence reputation signals compared with technical/industry reviews, but they do indicate some user dissatisfaction. On legal/regulatory, one risk provider says a US regulatory overhang was cleared in March 2026 and notes the SEC case was dismissed.

I could not verify this claim independently from the provided results, so it should be treated as *unverified marketing/secondary-analytics output* rather than confirmed fact. On fraud/rug/insolvency allegations, I found no credible source in the provided results alleging a rug pull, fraud, or insolvency event for JustLend V1. The main unresolved concern remains governance concentration plus the protocol’s heavy exposure to TRON and its ecosystem governance structure.

Assessment date: September 6, 2026. Strategy/assets: TRON-only Compound-V2-style pooled lending. Users supply supported TRX/TRC-20 assets and receive jTokens; borrowers over-collateralize supplied assets, borrow, repay, and redeem underlying. Supply yield is driven by per-block borrow rates, utilization, and the reserve factor. Yield source: Primarily borrower-paid interest; the documented formula is Supply Base APY = (1 − reserve factor) × Borrow APY × utilization.

Historical USDD “mining APY” existed, but the current incentive split is Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Risk profile: Market-neutral lending exposure at the strategy level, but suppliers retain underlying-asset price/oracle, smart-contract, liquidity, and liquidation risks. No evidence of native restaking or external protocol deployment was verified. Leverage/looping is user-enabled rather than an automated vault strategy: supplied assets must be explicitly enabled as collateral before borrowing. Lock-ups/withdrawals: No fixed lock-up documented.

Withdrawals use redeem or redeemUnderlying, subject to account health and available market cash; insufficient cash can cause withdrawal failure. Fees/gates/limits: No protocol deposit/withdrawal fee was verified. Borrowing is limited by collateral factors, borrow caps, market liquidity, and comptroller rules. Liquidation can repay up to 50% of a borrower’s debt and seize incentivized collateral. TVL/APY/revenue (DeFiLlama analytics; not raw on-chain): Total TVL is $3.69B, entirely on TRON; DeFiLlama lists 22 tracked pools, average supply APY 0.6%, and active loans $195.83M.

Selected pool APYs include <0.01% for ETH and sTRX, 0.34% for wTRX, and <0.01% for BTCt. Thirty-day fees are $1.71M and protocol revenue $47,408; revenue is defined as the reserve-factor share. Trend/history: DeFiLlama reports TVL up 9.3% over 30 days; APY history/volatility and product-level TVL trend are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Dune TVL, exposure, and trend comparison are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 because Dune MCP was unavailable. Contradiction check: Previously recorded “zero current incentives” was not independently revalidated; treat it as unresolved, not confirmed. organic_yield_pct: null leverage_ratio: null

Assessment as of September 6, 2026: JustLend V1 reserves appear to be market-level protocol reserves, not a separately disclosed treasury. The V1 API defines reserves as “protocol reserves in the market”; the whitepaper states reserves are set aside from loan proceeds according to each market’s reserve factor and are inaccessible to borrowers/suppliers. The documented example shows a 10% reserve factor, but this is not sufficient to establish that every market currently uses 10%.

Addresses: reserves are held within the individual jToken market contracts, including jTRX TE2RzoSV3wFK99w6J9UnnZ4vLfXYoxvRwP, jUSDT TXJgMdjVX5dKiQaUi9QobwNxtSQaFqccvd, and other V1 market contracts listed in the API. The V1 Unitroller/comptroller is TGjYzgCyPobsNS9n6WcbdLVR9dH7mWqFx7. No separately identified multisig treasury or reserve custodian was found in the reviewed sources.

Control: protocol documentation describes JST/WJST governance through GovernorBravo TEqiF5JbhDPD77yjEfnEMncGRZNDt2uogD and Timelock TRWNvb15NmfNKNLhQpxefFz7cNjrYjEw7x; governance is documented as controlling reserve-related parameters and reserve use. Independent verification of current admin, executor permissions, and reserve balances was not performed. Composition and size: the API exposes reserves per underlying asset, but the accessible example is a historical response captured July 15, 2026 and is stale under the seven-day freshness rule.

Current USD composition, total reserve value, and current market-by-market balances are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026. Dune was unavailable; therefore no Dune query ID or execution ID exists for this check, and no on-chain balance is asserted. Independent reserve attestations were Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

No material source contradiction identified; the main finding is the absence of a separately disclosed treasury and current independently verified reserve valuation.

JustLend V1 on Tron does have a native token: JST (JUST), a TRC-20 token on TRON with contract address TCFLL5dx5ZJdKnWuesXxi1VPwjLVmWZZy9. The docs state a maximum supply of 9.9 billion JST; current circulating supply, market cap, FDV, top-holder concentration, insider wallets, and whether any announced unlocks actually occurred on-chain are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the evidence gathered here. The protocol documentation says JST is the core governance token for JUST and JustLend DAO, used for on-chain proposal creation, voting, cancellation, and timelocked execution via GovernorBravo/Timelock.

The same docs and third-party summaries indicate a buyback-and-burn model tied to protocol/ecosystem revenue, with burn reducing effective circulating supply; however, exact revenue-share mechanics, current emissions, unlock schedule, and whether any scheduled unlocks happened on-chain are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. I did not find verifiable evidence of staking rewards, fee-switch rights, mint/blacklist controls, or who controls them from the gathered sources, so those are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. DEX liquidity depth and main listings were also Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the gathered sources.

Available sources suggest JST is widely listed and liquid on major venues, but that claim is not sufficiently grounded here to treat as confirmed.

A Bitcoin move below $10,000 would be a severe stress event for JustLend V1 on TRON because the protocol explicitly warns that a sharp decline in collateral value can cause under-collateralization or even bad debt. JustLend’s own risk docs say liquidation occurs when an account’s risk value reaches 100, and that users are liquidated when collateral can no longer cover the borrow.

Under a 20% depeg of the largest collateral on Tron, JustLend V1 would become materially riskier for borrowers whose positions are already close to liquidation, because collateral value falling is a direct trigger for liquidation in JustLend’s risk model. However, the exact portfolio-wide impact for JustLend V1 is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 because the provided sources do not include on-chain collateral composition, chain-specific exposure, or account-level liquidation simulations. What is verifiable from the sources is the protocol’s liquidation mechanism: JustLend states that liquidation happens when a borrower’s risk value reaches 100, where risk is defined as Total Borrow / Borrow Limit × 100.

The docs also state that liquidation can occur when collateral value declines, and liquidators can repay debt in exchange for collateral with an incentive/reward. That means a 20% price drop in the largest collateral asset would reduce the borrow capacity of all accounts using that asset as collateral, potentially pushing some positions above the liquidation threshold. Because no current market or position data is available in the results, the following cannot be quantified: share of TVL in the largest collateral, number of affected accounts, estimated liquidations, or bad-debt loss under a 20% shock.

The protocol pages and docs show the rule set, but not the live exposures needed for a stress result.

For JustLend V1 on Tron, a “top counterparty insolvent” stress is best mapped to a large borrower default in the shared jToken pool, not a bilateral counterparty model. In V1, an account becomes insolvent when its borrow balance exceeds allowed collateral, and liquidation is triggered when risk value reaches 100; liquidators repay debt and seize collateral with an 8% reward.

• Expected loss path: If the borrower cannot post more collateral, the position is liquidated. The liquidator repays the borrower’s debt in the borrowed token and receives the borrower’s supplied jTokens/collateral, so the borrower’s shortfall is first absorbed by seized collateral and the liquidation incentive.
• Who absorbs it: The liquidator absorbs execution/market risk during liquidation; any residual loss after collateral seizure is ultimately borne by the lenders/pool if collateral is insufficient, which would show up as protocol insolvency risk.
• Compensation: The liquidator is compensated through the liquidation reward of 8% of repaid debt value, and receives the collateral transferred on-chain as part of the liquidation settlement.
• Impact path through smart contracts: Risk is enforced by the risk model / Comptroller-style checks in the V1 architecture; when health deteriorates, the liquidation function is called on the relevant jToken market, repaying debt and transferring collateral. The docs and contracts overview describe V1 as a Compound V2-style jToken market with a risk model contract, while the liquidation flow is executed via the market’s liquidateBorrow path.
• What is not verifiable: The exact size of any uninsured shortfall, reserve coverage, or whether a specific “top counterparty” is currently exposed is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the provided sources alone.

For the stress scenario of committed fraud by the DAO or owners, I could not verify any public evidence of such fraud from the provided sources. The available materials describe centralization-related risks and governance/parameter control, but they do not document an actual fraud event by JustLend DAO or its owners. What is verifiable is that JustLend has some admin/governance-controlled risk surfaces: its audit flags "centralization related risks," and the docs note that protocol parameters such as collateral factors and oracle-related settings can be adjusted.

The bug bounty also treats governance and economic attacks as out of scope for certain exploit classes, which indicates the protocol acknowledges these risks but does not evidence fraud. For a fraud assessment, the correct status is: Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Based on the provided sources, I can only say the protocol has governance and oracle-centralization risk, not proven committed fraud by the DAO or owners.

For JustLend V1 on Tron, the primary yield source negative over the last 30 days is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available sources. The only direct performance datapoint in the search results is RootData’s 30d figure for the JustLend project, which shows +3.59%, not negative, but that is an aggregator-level project metric rather than a verified V1, Tron-only primary-yield source measure. What can be said with confidence is that JustLend is a Tron lending protocol where borrower liquidations are triggered when risk value exceeds 100, and the platform exposes market/APY and account-risk views through its dApp and API.

However, the search results do not provide a verifiable 30-day APY series for the V1 markets on Tron, nor a breakdown showing the main yield source turning negative. So the stress-scenario answer is: negative 30d primary yield source: Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. The closest available signal is the positive 30d project-level return reported by RootData, which conflicts with the premise if interpreted as a negative-yield event.

Assessment as of September 13, 2026. Identity matches JustLend V1 on TRON: the documented governance stack is JST → WJST → GovernorBravo → Timelock. JustLend documents a 200M JST proposal threshold, 600M JST quorum, approximately three-day voting, and a 48-hour execution delay; these remain protocol-documented parameters, not independently Dune-verified in this run. Process/control. The formal path is proposal → vote → queue → timelock → execution.

GovernorBravo is described as controlling upgrades and protocol parameters. However, governance is not fully permissionless in practice: JustLend states that its Risk DAO may tune protocol parameters directly without member voting. This makes DAO control materially hybrid/symbolic for risk settings, so dao_governance is assessed false. Privileged powers. The CertiK assessment records admin-controlled implementation changes for core market contracts and an anchorAdmin role able to set oracle anchors and pause/resume markets; the report says compromise could cause user losses.

It also records that the former GovernorAlpha guardian was renounced, while the current status of every privileged role was not independently rechecked here. Multisig / concentration / company control. Multisig threshold, signer identities, signer independence, current privileged-key holders, JST/WJST top-holder concentration, and voting concentration: Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026. Dune MCP was unavailable, so no on-chain claims or holder percentages are made. The forum ToS calls “JustLend DAO” the company operating the forum, but entity jurisdiction, registration number, directors, and broader company control of contracts/frontend/funds: Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026.

Entity / jurisdiction. The interface Terms identify the provider only as “Just Team” and describe access to a decentralized TRON lending protocol; the reviewed documents do not disclose a registered company number, incorporation jurisdiction, registered office, foundation, or DAO legal wrapper. Entity and jurisdiction: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Terms / restrictions. The Terms require users to be at least 18, comply with applicable law, and accept that use is at their own risk. They prohibit sanctioned persons/jurisdictions and expressly list mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the United States, and Singapore as excluded categories.

The Terms also disclaim fiduciary duties, warranties, responsibility for smart-contract losses, and liability for many forms of damage. KYC / AML. No protocol-level onboarding, identity verification, or AML program is disclosed in the reviewed V1 materials. Compliance is largely represented as a user obligation through sanctions and legality representations.

This creates a material gap between contractual restrictions and practical permissionless smart-contract access. Formal KYC/AML controls: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Classification. Functionally, JustLend V1 is a non-custodial, overcollateralized crypto lending/money-market protocol with floating rates, jTokens, borrowing, and liquidation. Its treatment as lending, banking, a money-market product, securities, commodities, derivatives, or a virtual-asset service is jurisdiction- and fact-dependent; no formal regulatory classification or licensing statement was found. Formal classification/licensing: Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Warnings, enforcement, litigation, sanctions. Searches of the reviewed regulator, court, and sanctions paths found no confirmed action specifically against JustLend or “Just Team”; because no legally identified entity is disclosed, definitive clearance is not possible. Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Data protection. The privacy policy claims access, correction, erasure, objection, and restriction rights, permits international transfers, uses third-party processors/cookies, and limits liability for internet transmission. It names no clearly identified legal controller or governing privacy jurisdiction.

Legal structure vs. actual risk. “DAO” branding and code-based execution do not establish limited liability or eliminate exposure for identifiable developers, interface operators, governors, or other participants. The absence of a confirmed legal wrapper materially increases enforcement, contractual, insolvency, and user-recourse uncertainty.

No exact GLEIF LEI record for 'Just Team', 'JustLend V1'. OFAC SDN screening of 'Just Team', 'JustLend V1': no match. SEC litigation and administrative release feeds: no mention.

JustLend V1 does not appear to issue its own stablecoin; the ecosystem stablecoin is USDJ, which is described in independent sources as a TRON-native, dollar-pegged stablecoin associated with JUST/JustStable rather than JustLend itself. The available evidence does not let this run verify which specific stablecoin market(s) were used by JustLend V1 over time, so protocol-specific depeg history is not fully verifiable as of 2026-09-06. The only supported conclusion is that USDJ existed and was intended to track $1, but a protocol-level depeg count, last depeg date, and maximum depeg percentage for the stablecoin used by JustLend V1 are not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

JustLend V1’s principal risks are inherited Compound-style smart-contract complexity, oracle dependence, liquidation/liquidity stress, governance concentration, and TRON/stablecoin concentration. Dune MCP was unavailable for this assessment; therefore, protocol balances, exposure weights, holder concentration, and current market parameters are Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026. DeFiLlama reports approximately $3.657 billion TVL and $199.27 million active loans on TRON, but these are analytics-platform figures, not raw on-chain verification.

The strongest verifiable strengths of JustLend V1 on TRON are: (1) established market maturity — it is the original pool-based lending protocol and part of a larger DAO stack that the docs describe as the largest lending protocol on TRON; (2) shared-liquidity capital efficiency — the V1 model pools supply across markets, allowing borrowers to reuse collateral and lenders to earn without actively managing loans; (3) low-cost, fast TRON execution — the protocol is built for TRON assets, where transactions are generally inexpensive and fast; (4) broad TRON asset support — the docs describe multiple active and legacy jToken markets, indicating diversified token coverage; and (5) transparent, on-chain lending mechanics — interest rates are algorithmic and protocol interactions are recorded on-chain, which supports auditability and predictable market behavior. A few user-facing benefits are also repeatedly emphasized in independent overviews: JustLend’s design enables borrowing while continuously earning supply yield, and its TRON-native integration includes energy-rental and staking-related features that reduce friction for TRON users. If you want this framed as a risk-analysis style list, the same five strengths can be restated as maturity, liquidity efficiency, TRON-native cost advantage, asset breadth, and transparency.