Save

Save is an algorithmic lending and borrowing protocol on Solana, originally launched as Solend and rebranded to Save around mid‑2024. Protocol identification

• Name: Save (formerly Solend)
• Category: DeFi lending/borrowing / “permissionless savings account” on Solana.
• Website: save.finance (landing and app).
• Docs: docs.save.finance.
• Chains: Solana only; all sources describe it specifically as a Solana lending protocol.
• Launch date: Core lending protocol launched 2021 as Solend; Save brand introduced 2024 via rebrand.
• Native token: Governance/tokenomics token SAVE, migrated from SLND after rebrand. Main contract / program identification (Solana)
• Analytics platforms list a primary Solana program address for Save / Solend as SAVEaeeq...CfdzWf (truncated), with a Solscan reference.
• Protocol docs describe cTokens (e.g. cUSDC) as the yield‑bearing deposit receipts used by Save, implying a central lending market program issuing these tokens.
• Explorer‑level, exact program IDs, upgrade authority status, and deployment timestamps are Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04 under current constraints. Because direct on‑chain inspection and query cross‑checks are unavailable in this run, all contract/address details remain unverified and should be treated as aggregator‑level data, not on‑chain verified facts. Fork lineage / upstream design
• Multiple sources describe Save/Solend as similar to Aave‑style lending on Ethereum: over‑collateralized loans, utilization‑based interest, liquidations by third parties, flash‑loan style capabilities.
• This is conceptual lineage, not an explicit hard fork; no source states that Save is a direct code fork of Aave or any other protocol.
• Save expanded Solend’s design with:
• A native stablecoin sUSD (0% interest borrow against SOL).
• A liquid staking token (saveSOL) and a memecoin shorting app.
• Repositioning as a “permissionless savings account.” Audit / fork‑risk history
• Public summaries emphasize Save/Solend as one of the oldest Solana lending protocols, surviving major stress events (FTX collapse, 2022 whale liquidation crisis).
• Specific audit reports, auditors, scope, and whether post‑rebrand changes (sUSD, saveSOL) were audited are Not verifiable as of 2026‑09‑04.
• No independent source in this set reports malicious modifications in Save forks or known hostile clones; however, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Given the lack of direct on‑chain and audit‑document verification in this run, protocol identification should be treated as aggregator‑verified, not on‑chain verified.

Save on Solana appears to be a live application, not just a landing page: the official site presents lending/borrowing product access, and the documentation includes user-level instructions for actions such as withdraw and borrow, which indicates functional app behavior rather than pure marketing. The docs also describe Save as a decentralized lending and borrowing protocol on Solana and reference concrete user flows, which supports product maturity beyond a static homepage. The public web evidence is not sufficient to verify whether deposits and withdrawals are currently live at this moment, whether any links are broken, or whether any displayed metrics are fake or templated.

Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. UX-wise, the presence of a dedicated documentation site with transaction guidance is a positive maturity signal, but I cannot independently confirm the quality of the interface, wallet flows, or whether the portal is fully operational from the available web results alone. On open API: the supplied sources do not explicitly document a public API for Save.

Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. Overall, the evidence points to a real DeFi product with supporting docs and user instructions, but live functionality, broken-link status, and API availability remain unconfirmed from these sources alone.

Save (formerly Solend) publishes an active bug bounty program on its docs. The published scope is broad and covers “all on-chain programs and associated program authorities” as well as the Save frontend and related infrastructure, with rewards by severity: Critical = 10% of value at risk, capped at $1,000,000 USD; High = $50,000 USD; Medium = $5,000 USD. Researchers are instructed to report findings by email to security@solend.fi.

The docs page does not state a launch date, so the program’s start date is not verifiable from the provided sources. No public results or payout totals were provided in the sources, so results are not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

Assessment (as of September 6, 2026): Medium–High counterparty/composability risk; exposure sizing remains unverified. Dune/on-chain verification is unavailable in this run: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 for reserve-by-asset, pool-by-pool, stablecoin/LST, bridge-token, treasury, custodian, CEX/MM, administrator, or RWA/SPV exposure. Oracle dependency — material. Save’s lending markets primarily use Pyth, with Switchboard as fallback; prices determine account health and liquidation eligibility. Permissionless pools may use only Switchboard, and Switchboard feeds can be configured from CEX APIs or DEX liquidity pairs. This creates stale-price, source-concentration, feed-divergence, and manipulation risk. Historical failure evidence. Save, formerly Solend, suffered a November 2, 2022 oracle-manipulation incident with approximately $1.3 million reported lost.

This is a demonstrated dependency failure mode, not merely a theoretical risk. Liquidation/composability risk. Third-party liquidators are required to repay debt and sell collateral. During oracle outages, Solana congestion, thin liquidity, or sharp market moves, liquidations may be delayed or execute at impaired prices, creating bad debt and withdrawal stress. Save’s own risk documentation also identifies smart-contract and 100%-utilization risks. Stablecoins, LSTs, bridges, custodians, CEX/MM, RWA. Specific current exposure percentages and concentration by issuer or venue are Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

No reviewed source independently establishes a custodian, RWA issuer/SPV, or bridge as a required dependency for the Solana lending markets; absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Contradiction callout: Save’s front-end currently displays $0 for deposits, borrows, and TVL, while DeFiLlama reports approximately $85.04 million TVL and $154.87 million active loans, entirely on Solana. This analytics/UI discrepancy is unresolved without on-chain verification; the figures must not be treated as independently confirmed. Structured fields: dependency_failure_active = null; max_exposure_pct = null.

Save on Solana is organized as a decentralized lending and borrowing protocol rather than a protocol-native custody system. For institutional-style use, the available evidence points to assets being held in users’ wallets or in third-party/qualified custody arrangements outside the protocol itself, with the lending design allowing deposits and withdrawals through the protocol while access-controls documentation says user funds cannot be locked by config changes. The strongest verified custody-related signals are that Solana ecosystem custodians support SOL custody/staking and that Save’s integrations are described as preserving an institutional custody wrapper, but a protocol-specific custody segregation model is not verifiable from the available sources.

Withdrawal status is not verifiable as of 2026-09-06. Segregated-assets status is not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

On August 19, 2021, an authorization flaw in UpdateReserveConfig() allowed an attacker to alter reserve parameters, make accounts liquidatable, and set borrow APY to 250%. Five users were wrongfully liquidated; no protocol funds were stolen. Solend halted the issue, refunded affected users from liquidation proceeds, increased monitoring and its bug bounty, and fixed the authorization check.

On-chain reimbursement verification was skipped because Dune was unavailable: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

A separate June 2022 incident involving Save/Solend was the 'DeFi Moral Paradox' liquidation-risk episode, in which a whale position created more than $100 million of liquidation risk and the team proposed extraordinary intervention to manage the position.

Save: Market Manipulation via Risk Parameter Abuse on Solana; loss $1,026,000 (DeFiLlama hacks registry).

Save: Oracle Manipulation via Spot Price Manipulation on Solana; loss $1,260,000 (DeFiLlama hacks registry). Remediation status: resolved (retained evidence).

Reported response to the November 2022 Save exploit: the affected pools were frozen within hours, oracle feeds were patched by November 3, 2022, and the protocol reportedly absorbed the bad debt into its treasury to protect users.

In November 2022, the FTX-driven SOL price crash and liquidation/oracle congestion left the Solend Main Pool with approximately 6.25 million USDC and 12.8 thousand SOL of bad debt. This was a protocol liquidity/liquidation failure rather than a direct exploit. Solend proposed using treasury funds to fully repay the Main Pool bad debt and prevent depositor losses.

The total USD loss, final execution of repayment, and exact user reimbursement are not independently verifiable without on-chain checks: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

Save’s key-management setup on Solana is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available sources. I could confirm only that Solana supports multiple signing backends—such as local in-memory keys, cloud KMS/HSM, and managed wallets—and that Keychain provides a unified signing interface across those backends. For Save specifically, no reliable source in the provided results identifies which signer or custody model it uses, whether it separates hot and cold keys, or whether it relies on program-derived addresses, multisig, MPC, or an external key-management provider.

The GitHub result is for Goki, a general Solana key-management suite, not evidence about Save’s implementation. If you want, I can next check Save’s verified contract/explorer footprint, governance, or GitHub repo for any explicit signer and custody design.

As of September 6, 2026, Dune/on-chain verification was unavailable; therefore current deployment, authority, and timelock facts are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-06. Documented architecture (not independently verified): Save is the former Solend Solana lending program. Save documentation identifies program So1endDq2YkqhipRh3WViPa8hdiSpxWy6z3Z6tMCpAo, lending-market owner 5pHk2TmnqQzRF9L6egy5FfiyBgS7G9cMZ5RFaJAvghzw, and fee receiver 9RuqAN42PTUi9ya59k9suGATrkqzvb9gk2QABJtQzGP5. The program uses lending markets → reserves → liquidity vaults/collateral mints, with Pyth/Switchboard oracle integrations. User wallet → Save lending program → Lending market → Reserve → liquidity vault ↘ oracle feeds Upgrade authority → program code (Solana BPF upgrade loader) Upgrade/admin risk: The official access-control page says the program is upgradeable, controlled by an upgrade authority, and has no timelock; it also says the team holds the authority.

However, that page presents conflicting authority values (2Fwvr3... in the table versus GDmSxp... in the prose), so the current authority and admin type are unresolved. No independent current confirmation of multisig, PDA, governance, or timelock was available. Capabilities: Admin-controlled code upgrades could theoretically alter withdrawals, liquidation logic, fees, oracle handling, or fund-accounting logic. Market-owner configuration changes are described as unable to directly move user funds, but this is an unverified marketing/protocol claim.

Withdrawal availability still depends on reserve liquidity; current exitability is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-06. If the upgrade key were compromised, worst case is malicious code causing theft, oracle manipulation, freezing, or forced liquidations across affected markets. Audit: Save documents a Kudelski audit and Soteria scanning, but deployment-specific audit coverage and post-upgrade scope are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

Published-report inventory rechecked on September 6, 2026. Only one public audit report could be confirmed for Save/Solend’s Solana lending program. Save’s risk page names Neodyme and OSEC/OtterSec, but no corresponding published audit report covering this Solana deployment was identified after separate searches; the OtterSec publication index contains Solend Steamm on Sui, not this program.

Soteria is described only as a scanner, without a separate published report. Current deployed-code/bytecode match: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

For Save (Solana), I could verify only aggregator-level identification of the protocol and a historical incident note on DeFiLlama. I could not verify any audit report, auditor, date, scope, link, findings, fix status, or whether an audit covers the currently deployed code. The required bytecode-match check is not verifiable as of 2026-08-31 because no on-chain verification tools were available in this run.

Automated static/dynamic security scanning of the Solend/Save lending protocol contracts.

Save is the rebrand of Solend, a Solana lending protocol founded in 2021 by a public founder known as Rooter (@0xrooter); multiple third-party profiles and posts identify him as the founder, while his LinkedIn lists him as founder of Save and Suilend. Credibility check: Rooter is presented as a technical founder with prior engineering experience in Silicon Valley, but the web results do not independently verify his employers, education, or full career history, so those claims remain *partly unverified*. Prior projects / outcomes: The strongest verifiable track record is the protocol itself: Solend launched in 2021, won a Solana hackathon according to third-party coverage, and later rebranded to Save; however, the results do not provide on-chain or primary-source confirmation of the hackathon win. Hack / incident history: Save/Solend is linked to a documented November 2022 incident described by DeFiLlama as a $1.26m “Price Oracle Attack” / ecosystem exploit, which is the main public adverse event in the available results. Public vs anon: The founder is public; the broader team is described as experienced, but the available results do not fully identify all core contributors, so team transparency is *partial*. Real business vs web front: The protocol appears to be a real operating DeFi business rather than a mere web front, because multiple independent sources describe an active lending protocol with long-running market presence, but office location, legal entity structure, and onshore/offshore jurisdiction are *not verifiable as of 2026-09-04*. Office / jurisdiction: Save’s founder LinkedIn shows Singapore, and one article says “Singapore,” but that is not enough to confirm a real office or whether the business is onshore/offshore. Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

Save is the rebranded Solend lending protocol on Solana, and its reputation is generally better described as *established but mixed* rather than cleanly “blue-chip.” It has been operating since 2021, survived the FTX-driven Solana downturn, and by 2024–2026 was being described by third-party sources as one of Solana’s most proven lending protocols by longevity and resilience. On fundamentals, the public record shows at least two audits were published on GitHub, and independent review sites later referenced those audits. I could not verify founder or investor identities from the available sources here without risking a namesake mismatch, so founder/investor reputation is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

The main reputational blemish is the protocol’s early history around Solend. Community coverage and reporting referenced controversy tied to Alameda Research during the IDO period, including accusations that Alameda withdrew funding before the end of the sale, which became part of the protocol’s early public narrative. That is a reputational issue, not a confirmed legal finding.

Current sentiment is mixed-positive: independent ecosystem coverage characterizes Save as a long-lived, resilient Solana protocol with recovered TVL and continuing product development, while also noting open questions about whether newer products like saveSOL and SUSD will drive growth. DeFiLlama simply tracks the protocol as a lending market and does not provide a reputation assessment. I found no credible evidence in the retrieved sources of fraud, a rug pull, insolvency, active sanctions, or formal regulatory enforcement against Save/Solend.

Those allegations are Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the sources available here. The unresolved concerns are mainly execution and market-risk related: dependence on Solana ecosystem health, competition, and whether the expanded product suite can sustain usage.

Economic model — Save (formerly Solend), Solana. Save is primarily an overcollateralized lending market, not a standalone farming vault. Users supply supported assets (e.g., SOL, USDC, BTC, ETH and pool-specific tokens) and receive variable supply interest funded by borrower interest; users may also borrow against collateral. Supply yield is therefore predominantly lending-demand-driven and asset-denominated. Risk/strategy: The base model is generally market-neutral at the protocol level, but depositors retain direct price exposure to the supplied asset.

Borrowers can create directional or leveraged positions; recursive deposit/borrow strategies are technically possible. No evidence verifies protocol-level restaking, external yield deployment, or systematic leverage. Lock-ups: no fixed maturity is documented. Withdrawals redeem cTokens, subject to account-health checks, available liquidity, reserve limits, and possible market outflow limits.

Permissionless pool owners can change parameters and set global outflow caps. Yield sustainability: Organic yield is borrower-funded variable interest. Historical APY volatility, current pool-by-pool APY, and the portion attributable to liquidity-mining incentives cannot be independently decomposed here; Save documentation confirms SLND/other liquidity-mining rewards existed historically, so subsidized yield is possible. Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026 for the current organic/subsidized split or APY history. Fees/revenue: DeFiLlama reports borrow interest, origination, flash-loan, liquidation and account-close fees. Its methodology attributes protocol revenue to a 20% interest spread, 80% of origination/flash-loan fees, and 30% of liquidation penalties; this is analytics-platform data, not on-chain verification.

Latest indexed figures show approximately $86.46m TVL, $155.23m active loans, $52,910 fees and $11,241 protocol revenue over 30 days, all attributed to Solana. Contradiction / data quality: Save’s own interface displayed $84.72m TVL, while DeFiLlama showed $86.46m; separate Save SOL liquid-staking TVL was reported at $6.32m. Product definitions and snapshots differ. Dune TVL, product breakdown, chain trend, and on-chain APY history: Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.

Leverage/looping exposure and withdrawal gates cannot be quantified from available independent data. Structured fields: organic_yield_pct = null; leverage_ratio = null.

As of September 6, 2026, reserves/treasury are not independently verifiable. Dune on-chain verification was unavailable in this run, so no current Solana balances, reserve composition, USD valuation, liabilities, or block-height/timestamp snapshot can be established. Per the required missing-data rule: “Not verifiable as of September 6, 2026.” Save’s documentation describes lending-market reserve accounts, liquidity addresses holding supplied assets, fee-receiver addresses, and a market authority controlling reserves.

These are protocol architecture descriptions, not a verified treasury-reserve inventory or current balance proof. The public mainnet address documentation was not retrievable in a form that exposed a complete address table during this check. No independent reserve attestation, custody statement, reserve policy, or control/multisig evidence was identified from the available sources.

The Save website’s owner link resolved to an unusable Solscan account URL, so it does not establish a verified treasury address. Any reserve or TVL figures presented solely by Save would remain an unverified marketing claim unless matched to identifiable Solana accounts and independently checked. Contradiction / limitation: Save’s documentation indicates reserve-account infrastructure exists, but no independently verified current balances or treasury wallet set was available. On-chain figures therefore cannot be reported.

Tokenomics — Save (Solana), as of September 4, 2026

• Native token: Legacy SLND (Solend), mint SLNDpmoWTVADgEdndyvWzroNL7zSi1dF9PC3xHGtPwp. Save announced a 1:1 migration from SLND to SAVE on December 12, 2024, but the current SAVE mint address is Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Supply: Legacy SLND total/max supply is 100 million. Current circulating supply is contradictory: CoinGecko reports none, DeFiLlama reports 0, while CoinMarketCap reports 100 million. Current SAVE supply is Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Market cap / FDV: No reliable current market cap is available. Aggregators show approximately $12.6–16.2 million FDV for legacy SLND, with market cap either zero/unreported or equal to FDV—an unresolved data contradiction. Current SAVE values are Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Utility/governance: SLND governed the DAO, treasury and protocol parameters; it was also used for liquidity-mining incentives and permissionless-pool fees. No verified revenue distribution, buyback, burn or staking program for current SAVE was found.
• Emissions/unlocks: Historical emissions were 10 million SLND/year (0.1585 per slot), later converted to option-style rewards. Allocation: 60% community, 25% team, 15% investors/angels; team and seed unlocks were three-year schedules. Whether all announced unlocks occurred on-chain is Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.
• Concentration/insiders: Holder concentration, treasury balances and identifiable insider wallets are Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. DeFiScreener shows ~11,830 holders but no defensible concentration analysis.
• Admin controls: DexScreener flags legacy SLND as mintable; exact mint/freeze authority, blacklist capability and controller are Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Protocol fee receiver is documented as 9RuqAN42PTUi9ya59k9suGATrkqzvb9gk2QABJtQzGP5.
• Liquidity/listings: Main identifiable venue is Raydium SLND/USDC, with approximately $3,000 liquidity and negligible recent volume; current SAVE liquidity/listings are Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026.

Save on Solana is exposed to a Bitcoin sub-$10,000 stress mainly through market-driven channels, not direct Bitcoin protocol exposure. The most likely transmission is a sharp SOL price drawdown and a broader risk-off liquidation cycle that reduces collateral values, deposit growth, and borrower demand across DeFi. Key stress points for a Solana yield protocol in this scenario:

• TVL compression: If BTC breaks $10,000, risk assets typically reprice lower in sympathy; on Solana that would pressure native collateral, LP positions, and strategy NAVs.
• Collateral stress: Any BTC-linked or high-beta collateral used in vaults can face liquidations, higher haircuts, and tighter leverage tolerance.
• Yield degradation: Lower on-chain activity and weaker speculative inflows usually reduce trading fees, borrow demand, and incentive emissions, compressing real yield.
• Liquidity risk: Stablecoin outflows and thinner DEX depth can worsen slippage and make rebalancing or withdrawals more costly.
• Counterparty/bridge risk: If the strategy relies on wrapped assets, cross-chain bridges, or external market makers, a BTC shock can amplify operational and settlement risk. What is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available web results: Save’s exact Solana TVL, asset composition, leverage, liquidation thresholds, oracle design, and BTC sensitivity. Because Dune/on-chain verification is unavailable in this run, I cannot quantify protocol-specific loss scenarios or exposure percentages. Practical interpretation: in a BTC <$10k regime, Save should be treated as facing high probability of AUM contraction, lower yield, and elevated liquidation/withdrawal risk if it is exposed to volatile collateral or leveraged vault mechanics. If you want, I can next build a chain-specific stress checklist for Save on Solana using only publicly accessible non-onchain sources.

Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. The provided search results do not include protocol-specific collateral composition, loan book data, or liquidation parameters for Save on Solana, so the impact of a 20% depeg in the largest collateral cannot be quantified from the available evidence. What can be said is that Solana lending protocols typically use collateralization thresholds and liquidations to manage depeg and volatility risk, and prior Solana ecosystem incidents show that liquid collateral depegs can trigger liquidations and losses for collateral suppliers.

If you want a defensible estimate, I would need Save’s Solana-side market data: supplied collateral by asset, borrow balances, liquidation thresholds, and oracle methodology; without that, any numeric stress loss would be speculative.

For Save on Solana, the exact counterparty-insolvency loss waterfall is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the available web sources. Save-specific smart-contract documentation, audits, and insolvency handling rules were not available in the results, so any protocol-specific compensation or absorption path would be speculation. What *can* be stated is the general stress path for a DeFi protocol when its top counterparty becomes insolvent: the loss first hits the protocol’s exposed position or custody relationship, then propagates through liquidation, redemption, or settlement logic in the contracts, and only after that can any insurance fund, reserve, or governance backstop compensate users if such a mechanism exists.

Counterparty insolvency can also leave a holder or user as an unsecured creditor if assets are held by a custodian that enters bankruptcy, delaying access to the assets rather than creating an immediate on-chain loss realization. In stress-testing terms, the largest-counterparty default is treated as an explicit adverse scenario because the firm must recognize the loss generated by the unexpected default of its largest counterparty, with net stressed losses depending on posted or received collateral and revaluation of positions. Applied to DeFi, the expected loss path is typically: counterparty failure → collateral impairment or missed payment/redemption → forced unwind or liquidation in the protocol → any shortfall absorbed by reserves, junior liquidity providers, or governance-funded recapitalization, if present.

But for Save specifically, those absorption and compensation rules are not verifiable as of 2026-09-04. If you want, I can next map this into a concise incident tree for Save once you provide the protocol’s contract addresses or a specific audit/doc set.

For Save on Solana, a committed fraud scenario by the DAO or owners is not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 from the provided sources. I did not find a source-confirmed incident specific to this protocol, and the available results are either about other Solana DAOs or general Solana security incidents rather than Save itself. What *is* supported is the broader risk pattern on Solana: DAO governance or signer compromise can be used to drain treasury funds, as reported in incidents such as BonkDAO’s treasury drain, Synthetify’s governance attack, and Saga DAO’s multisig breach.

However, these are not evidence that Save’s DAO or owners committed fraud. Because this run cannot use on-chain verification, any claim about Save treasury movements, privileged control, or owner-initiated fraud remains Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04.

For Save on Solana, a stress case with primary yield source negative 30d means the main income stream backing the strategy has been loss-making over the last 30 days, so the protocol’s headline yield is not self-sustaining from its core source. For Solana-native staking, the underlying yield is typically driven mainly by protocol inflation, with additional contribution from fees and MEV; if the primary source turns negative, the remaining yield components would not fully offset the drag in a stress scenario. The closest documented analogy in the supplied results is Solana staking economics: staking yield is based on inflation, fees, and validator performance, and 21Shares notes that if disinflation accelerates, nominal staking yield declines materially over time.

That supports the stress interpretation that a negative primary yield source would pressure Save’s return profile, but the exact impact on Save is Not verifiable as of 2026-09-04 because no protocol-specific on-chain or risk report for Save was provided. Risk read-through:

• Primary risk: earnings compression or outright negative carry if the main yield source stays negative.
• Secondary risk: higher reliance on residual fees/MEV or other non-primary sources, which are typically more variable.
• Institutional stance: treat advertised APY as *gross* until the strategy’s 30d primary source is confirmed positive and durable; otherwise the strategy is operating under yield stress, not normal conditions. If you want, I can also turn this into a short risk memo with severity, likelihood, and what to monitor for Save on Solana.

Governance assessment — Save (formerly Solend), Solana — as of September 13, 2026. Control: Save’s documentation says the Solend program is upgraded using a team-held authority and that no timelock is deployed; the lending-market owner can change reserve parameters but is documented as unable to directly move user funds. An independent April 2026 governance audit reports the effective control model as: per-market lending_market.owner EOA, narrowly scoped risk_authority, and protocol-level controls; it classifies Save’s upgrade authority as an unfunded raw keypair and the main market owner as a plain EOA. Proposal process / DAO reality: Save documents DAO wallets as governed by SLND holders. Historical governance used Realms/SPL Governance-style token-weighted proposals, but no current evidence was found that SLND governance controls program upgrades or the core lending-market owner.

Therefore the DAO is presently symbolic/limited for core protocol control, not effective protocol governance. Funds: Treasury wallets are listed, including a Solana “treasury msig,” but its signer set, threshold, and signer independence are not publicly verifiable from the sources reviewed. The documented lending-market owner cannot directly withdraw user funds; however, the independent audit reports admin-capable forced liquidation and bounded debt forgiveness without a governance vote. This is a material loss/socialization risk, though not an arbitrary direct drain path. CONTRADICTION / DATA GAP: The official access-control page contains conflicting upgrade-authority addresses between its table and prose, while the independent audit reports a corrected unfunded authority.

Dune was unavailable, so current upgrade authority, top SLND holders, voting concentration, treasury balances, multisig signers/threshold, and current frontend/developer control are Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026. Company entity, jurisdiction, registration number, directors, and applicable ToS controller are also Not verifiable as of September 13, 2026.

Legal & Regulatory (as of September 4, 2026) Entity / jurisdiction: Public records identify Concurrent C, Inc. as the entity associated with Solend/Save: an SEC-filed exhibit lists “Solend / Concurrent C Inc,” while business-directory and registry-derived records place Concurrent C, Inc. in Panama. The primary corporate registration, ownership, registered office, and relationship between Concurrent C, Inc. and the Save interface were not independently verified. Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Legal structure / classification: Save presents itself as an algorithmic, decentralized, permissionless Solana lending protocol. The public materials do not establish a regulated bank, broker-dealer, money-market fund, lender, or registered securities issuer.

Whether SAVE tokens, lending activities, liquid-staking products, or stablecoin products constitute securities, commodities, lending products, or money-transmission activity depends on jurisdiction and facts; no formal legal opinion or regulator classification was located. ToS / restrictions / KYC-AML: No current, publicly indexed protocol Terms of Service, governing-law clause, privacy notice, KYC/AML policy, or restricted-jurisdiction policy was located. The core app appears wallet-based and permissionless, which suggests no conventional account-opening KYC, but this is an operational inference—not proof of legal non-compliance. Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Warnings / enforcement / litigation: Save’s own risk documentation warns of smart-contract, utilization, oracle, liquidation, and market risks; these are technical disclosures, not regulatory warnings.

No regulator enforcement action, court case, or sanctions designation against Save, Concurrent C, Inc., or Solend was identified in the reviewed sources. FTX bankruptcy materials list Solend/Concurrent C, Inc. among investment-related counterparties, but that does not constitute enforcement against Save. Data protection: The controller, processing purposes, retention, international transfers, and user rights are not publicly verifiable from the reviewed materials. Not verifiable as of September 4, 2026. Actual-risk assessment: Legal transparency is weak: the protocol is permissionless and marketed as decentralized, but the responsible legal entity, jurisdictional perimeter, contractual terms, and compliance framework are unclear.

This creates material counterparty, regulatory, jurisdiction-shopping, and recourse risk despite the absence of identified enforcement. Structured fields:

• active_enforcement: false (no identified action; not a guarantee of absence)
• sanctioned: false (no identified designation)
• entity: Concurrent C, Inc. (association publicly indicated; not fully verified)
• jurisdiction: Panama (indicated, not independently verified)

GLEIF LEI registry unavailable at scan time. OFAC SDN screening of 'Concurrent C Inc', 'Save': no match. SEC litigation and administrative release feeds: no mention.

Save does issue its own stablecoin, SUSD, but a verifiable historical depeg record for SUSD itself is not available from the gathered sources. The safest conclusion is that SUSD is intended to be stable, while its actual peg performance remains Not verifiable as of 2026-09-06.

Save (formerly Solend) is a Solana lending protocol with material historical oracle, governance, and smart-contract incidents. Its principal risks are amplified by centralized upgrade control, oracle dependence, liquidation/liquidity stress, and governance concentration. Contradiction: Save’s public page displays $0 deposits/borrows/TVL while also showing $84.7m TVL; on-chain reconciliation is Not verifiable as of September 5, 2026.

For Save on Solana, the top strengths are: fast settlement, very low transaction costs, high throughput/scalability, single-chain composability, and a large, active ecosystem. These are the most consistently cited advantages of Solana across independent research and industry analysis.

• Fast settlement: Solana is described as a high-performance, low-latency network with sub-second confirmations, which is a core advantage for a yield protocol that depends on timely rebalancing and user interactions.
• Low fees: Multiple sources emphasize Solana’s extremely low transaction costs, often fractions of a cent, making frequent deposits, withdrawals, and strategy actions economically viable.
• High throughput / scalability: Solana’s architecture is designed for high transaction capacity, with proof-of-history plus proof-of-stake and parallel execution supporting very high TPS relative to older chains.
• Single-chain composability: Solana’s monolithic design lets applications share the same state environment, which improves interoperability among DeFi apps and can simplify integrations for a yield protocol.
• Deep ecosystem and developer activity: Solana is repeatedly characterized as having a broad app layer and strong ecosystem momentum, including DeFi and payments use cases, which increases available liquidity and composable counterparties for protocols like Save.